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This dissertat.ion investigates the debate between Georg Luk.3.cs 
and Bertolt Brecht in the 1930s, known as the Expressionist 
Debate. and the controversy between Jean-Francais Lyotard and 
LTuergen Habermas. which took place in the 1980s. The two 
debates. both of which took place among writers of the Left. are 
juxtaposed in order to shed more light on the issues at stake in 
the Expressionist Debate when looked at in the light of 
postmodern concerns. The dissertation is based on selected texts 
by each of the four writers. 
The introduction sets out to place the two debates into their 
historical context as well as setting out the aims and the 
methodology of the dissertation. The specific texts by Lukacs. 
Brecht, Lyotard and Habermas are listed. 
The first chapter examines the texts by Lukacs and Brecht to 
establish their respective positions. The debate \wtnch is 
extracted only from the texts in quest ion) is investigated in 
terms of Marxist aesthetic theory, namely. that of realism. 
Substantial attention is given to the philosophy of Marx and its 
relation to that of Hegel. Hegel's background is also briefly 
set out. The cone lus ion drawn is that Lukacs and Brecht both 
express opinions in line with Marxist philosophy and its aims. 
Their controversy lies in a divergence of opinion in terms of the 
method of the representation of reality as seen through Marxist 
eyes. 
Similarly, the second chapter examines the texts by Lyotard and 
Haoermas. It is found that the controversy here revolves around 
the disagreement as to whether the Enlightenment prc•ject of 
modernity should be discarded, seen by both writers as not having 
been successful in its original aim of promoting happiness as a 
result of an acivancernen t of 1<-.n(;,w ledge. or whether it should 
rather be seen as a project as yet unfinished. Lyotard's 
position is emphatically in favour of the former option. while 
Habermas argues for the latter. advocating a reunification of 
language games as he puts forward a social theory of what he 
caLLS 'communicative reason'. Lyotard is of the opinion that 
such a move can only lead to political totalitarianism. This 
chapter pays a great deal of attention to the Enlightenment. 
especially to the philosophy of Kant. 
The conclusion takes some of the fir1dings of the preceding 
chapters, such as the concern of totality versus fragmentation. 
and highlights what is seen to be a common but rather understated 
issue in the two debates, namely, the response of Marxist 
thinkers and writers to the challenges posed to them in the form 
of avant-gardism. My opinion is that this can be seen as the 
subtext of the two debates in question. 
I hereby declare that the work contained in this dissertation is 
my own work and that neither the substance nor any part thereof 
has been presented for any other degree. 






CHAPTER 1: Lukacs and Brecht 











I wish to thank my supervisor, Dr. Gunther Pakendorf. for the 
assistance he has given me in the preparation of this 
dissertation. Furthermore, I am grateful to my family for all 
their patience, support and encouragement. 
- i-
INTRODUCTION 
One could ask the question whether the hotly debated aesthetic 
dispute among the German Left in the 1930, s, in which Georg 
Lukacs and Bertolt Brecht were the main contenders, is of any 
interest in our present time in which the status of Marxism and 
contemplations about reality have shifted so radically. Known. 
on the whole, as the Expressionist debate, this was precipitated 
by Lukacs' sharp denunciation of that movement on aesthetic as 
well as on ideological grounds in response to what appeared to 
be its persistent influence on a number of the artists of the 
young German Left. Lukacs forced the debate to be one on the 
issues of realism, a word which he employed in his own specific 
sense; a sense in line with the official Soviet stipulation in 
terms of socialist realism. To assign the quality of 'realism' 
to a work of literature meant that the latter was rated high; it 
meant that it was perceived to fit into the set of criteria seen 
to be imperative. 
The present day American, Marxist critic, Frederic Jameson, in 
his essay, "Reflections in Conclusion", an afterword to 
Aesthetics and Politics, a collection of essays constituting much 
of the Expressionism/Realism debate in the 1930's. puts forward 
the opinion that the central issue of this debate, that is, the 
problem inherent in the actual concept of an aesthetic of realism 
as well the role artistic production should play in socio-
political terms, reaches back to pre-Marxist times and still 
continues to pose unresolved questions in our present period. 
He suggests that the opinions of both Lukacs and Brecht, although 
dated in some respects as a result of the changes having taken 
place ~n capitalism and its culture, do nevertheless have a 
relevance for us today. They are worth looking at in terms of 
the proble~s encountered in what he terms as the postmodern era. 
a phase which he sees as the logical, cultural result of 
capitalism in its final global state. He stresses, however. that 
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concepts of modernism and realism as such have to be renavigated 
and renegotiated in each different period, and that "a conception 
of realism must be judged in terms of the historical conjuncture 
in which it has to function" (Jameson 1977:213). 
The ''historical conjuncture" at which Lukacs and Brecht put 
forward their convictions about realism was one in which physical 
surv iva 1 was at stake, over and above surv iva 1 as an artist. 
Both writers were vehemently opposed to fascism, the Nazi 
government posing a threat to their very lives. Brecht fled from 
Germany in 1933, first to Denmark, then to Sweden, to Finland, 
to finally go to America via Russia in 1941. Lukacs, who had 
joined the Communist Party in Hungary after the First World War 
also fled Germany when the Nazis came into power and went to 
Moscow to eventually become a highly placed functionary in the 
Soviet bloc. However, the threat of Nazism was not the only 
repressive historical factor forming the background to this 
debate. In terms of the Stalinist regime writers were expected 
to subscribe to a particular mode of production; that of 
socialist realism as enforced by Andrei Zhdanov. The policy 
referred to as Zhdavonism was intent on purging Soviet literature 
of all Western influence during Stalin's regime. Many writers 
disappeared as a result of this action. In terms of the dispute 
concerning realism in this dissertation one would have to take 
into account that it is possible that, although Lukacs and Brecht 
(both Marxists) were on opposite sides of this debate as well as 
being differently situated in terms of the Soviet state, neither 
of them was completely free to express openly what they were 
possibly thinking. Thus, when studying their texts and assessing 
them in terms of their interpretation of their time and society, 
there must remain an awarenesss that there may be a gap dictated 
by the repressive political environment in which they found 
themselves. 
Half a ce:o.tury later, in the 1980's, another dispute arose 
between the theories of two powerful writers of the Left, namely, 
.Jean-Franco is Lyotard and Juergen Habermas. Generally known as 
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the Modernism/Postmodernism controversy, this debate was 
precipitated by Lyotard's sharp criticism of Habermas' notion of 
what he called the unfinished project of modernism. The latter 
directs his efforts to developing a social theory of 
communicative reason 1n which a shift from the paradigm of the 
knowledge of objects to one of "mutual understanding between 
subjects capable of speech and action" is advocated (Habermas 
1987:295). Lyotard, convinced that high political stakes are 
involved, rejects any notion of totality, fearing a resultant 
return to political totalitarianism with its accompanying terror 
(Lyotard 1984: 81). Although the ghost of Nazism and Stalinism 
certainly hovers in their work. these two writers did not write 
under the physical constraints placed upon Brecht and Lukacs in 
the Thirties by the actual systems in action. Be that as it may, 
some of the issues which are contested are shared by the two 
disputes. Whatever the differences, the question of power, 
totality, perspectives of reality, and the impact of writing in 
socio-political terms are high on the agenda in both 
controversies. 
It is my intention in this dissertation to make an investigative 
study of the two debates. I shall make use of the following 
selected texts by the four authors in the course of my 
investigation: "Realism in the Balance" by Lukacs; "The Essays 
of Georg Lukacs", "On the Formalistic Character of the Theory of 
Realism", "Remarks on an Essay", and "Popularity and Realism" by 
Brecht; "What is Postmodernism" by Lyotard; and "Modernity 
versus postmodernity" by Habermas. Over and above these I shall 
refer to Brecht's theatrical work, making use in particular of 
Drums in the Night, The Hessingkauf Dialogues and Die Antigone 
des Sophokles. As the latter's main cultural contribution was 
in the domain of the theatre. both on a practical and theoretical 
level, I feel that to discuss the articles against Lukacs on 
their own would only give a limited picture of his opinion. It 
must also ~e remembered that, although Brecht wrote the articles 
in the context of the debate, and ostensibly planned for their 
publication in Das Wort, they were not actually published at the 
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time when they were written, but only reached publication in 
1967. They could thus not form an active constituent of the 
debate at the time. The Messingkauf Dialogues, also only 
published as such after Brecht· s death, contains most of the 
latter's theories on theatrical praxis. 
I shall not expand in any detail on the actual social conditions 
surrounding the debates. Rather, I shall look at matters of 
philosophical genealogy. All the texts in question make 
reference in one way or another to the German Philosophical 
tradition, beginning with Kant. I have chosen to see this 
tradition as the link between the two debates. Another point in 
common is the issue of Marxism. My aim is to identify particular 
lines of thought in both debates. In the light of the epochal 
events that have taken place between the two debates, both on the 
political and the intellectual planes, it is of interest to see 
whether some of the lines of thought displayed in the debate of 
the thirties can be identified in that of the eighties as well. 
Certainly, many of the concepts appear in both debates. It will 
be of interest to see what has happened to them with the passing 
of time. 
My methodological approach will be as follows: I shall look 
specifically at the texts of each of the writers in an attempt 
to first establish just what they are saying and which issues 
they are contesting. At the same time account shall be taken of 
the philosophers which are referred to by actual name by the 
different writers. When examining a particular opinion, I shall 
at times interrupt the discussion to refer to the philosophical 
genealogy in an attempt to identify the possible origin of a line 
of thought that may have bearing on that particular opinion. The 
first chapter will focus more on the tradition in terms of Marx 
and Hegel, as that is the section most relevant to the 
Expressionist debate. The second Chapter will pay more attention 




Ambivalence appears to be the dominant feeling in much of the 
critical attitude towards Lukacs. As they embark on a critique 
of his role in the Expressionist debate, critics, such as Bloch, 
Jameson, and even Brecht, do not fail to qualify what they are 
about to say concerning his work. They pay tribute to him as a 
powerful writer within the Communist movement, whose contribution 
to the development of a Marxist, socialist, aesthetic theory must 
not be underestimated. Nevertheless, he has evoked vehement 
opposition from some of those very writers who. politically 
speaking, can be seen to be within his own ranks. As time went 
on, critical opinion has tended to favour the arguments put 
forward by Brecht and other exponents of Expressionism. Jameson 
suggests that one reason may have been that Brecht's style with 
its plebeian touch is more easily accessible than that of Lukacs 
(Jameson 1977: 199). Another reason may lie in a possible fear 
that Lukacs, seen to be of an older generation, may have rejected 
the new modernist development without having been fully in touch 
with it. Thirdly, there may have been anxiety on account of 
Lukacs' firm attachment to the Stalinist system; a system which 
left no space for any valid, alternative development in terms of 
aesthetic theory. But what seems to be the strongest objection, 
an objection especially put forward by Brecht, is that writers 
of the Left in exile, already writing under heavy constraints, 
found Lukacs' stipulations inimical to new art production 
(Benjamin 1977: 97). 
In his "Reflections in Conclusion", Jameson suggests that the 
underlying reason why any work on realism would be open to 
attack, including that of Lukacs and Brecht, lies in the inherent 
contradiction in the actual concept of realism itself (Jameson 
1977:198) .. He points out a fundamental difference between this 
category and the traditional ones, such as comedy. tragedy. 
lyric, epic amd drama. The latter, he says, are purely aesthetic 
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concepts, the individual works being regarded in terms of beauty 
and aesthetic play. Realism, however, claims cognitive as well 
as aesthetic status. In other words, it presupposes a form of 
aesthetic experience which at the same time claims a binding 
relationship to the real itself, that is, to realms of knowledge 
and praxis which had traditionally been differentiated from the 
aesthetic. The two constituents exist uneasily within one 
concept. Should there be an over-emphasis on the cognitive 
aspect then a work denies the necessarily fictive character of 
artistic discourse, and it could lead to a call for the 'end of 
art' in the name of political militancy. On the other hand, 
should there be an over-emphasis on the artistic techniques 
whereby an illusion of reality is produced, then the 'reality' 
of realism could be transformed into an appearance, undermining 
the referential value by which it distinguishes itself from the 
other categories of literature. 
Considering the difficulty, Jameson believes that Lukacs has been 
successful in balancing these two aspects. He estimates the 
latter's development of the theory of mediation to be the 
decisive contribution to a Marxist, aesthetic theory. Based on 
an insistence that literature and culture are of crucial 
significance to revolutionary politics, this theory challenges 
traditional content analysis. It enables the reader to uncover 
the political and ideological content of what had up to that time 
appeared to be purely formal aesthetic phenomena (Jameson 1977: 
200). Ronald Taylor, in his "Presentation I I", is of the opinion 
that Lukacs was the first writer to have attempted to construct 
a systematic Marxist account of the historical development of 
European Literature from the Enlightenment onwards. He judges 
the latter's analysis of the past in terms of it being a 
precondition for the present to be of a greater depth than that 
of Brecht. On the other hand, he finds Lukacs' precepts for 
twentieth qentury art to be often nostalgic, and even retrograde 
(Taylor 1977: 64). Be that as it may, Lukacs enjoyed 
considerable power as a writer within the Communist movement. his 
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theories having been the base on which other Marxist writers 
developed much of their work. 
The first serious attack on Lukacs· writing concerning 
expressionism came from the latter's former friend, Ernst Bloch. 
Responding to Lukacs· essay, "The Greatness and the Decline of 
Expressionism", and to an article by Alfred Kurella, which he 
sees as leaning heavily on this essay, he launches a protest 
against what he sees to be a wholesale disqualification of the 
products of an entire aesthetic movement; an unfair 
disqualification, grounded, as he sees it, not upon a close 
knowledge of the artifacts themselves, the majority of which are 
paintings, but on articles about them, that is, on secondary 
literature (Bloch 1938: 18-20). In other words, Bloch feels that 
Lukacs has not engaged with the actual artistic works, but has 
dismissed them on the grounds of theories which were not 
necessarily accurate in the representation of the movement 
itself. Furthermore, Bloch (together with Brecht) rejects what 
he perceives to be Lukacs' way of applying ideological labels to 
artistic practices, substantiating his aesthetic criticism of the 
Expressionistic movement with these ideological judgements. Not 
only does Lukacs condemn the works of art as being 'unrealistic·, 
suggesting that they are worthless, but he also associates them 
with the ideology of the archenemy, namely, Fascism. Here is a 
partial rendering of the excerpt which Bloch quotes from Lukacs' 
"The Greatness and the Dec line of Express ion ism": 
Der Expressionismus als schriftstellerische Ausdrucksform 
des entwickelten Impez:ialismus beruht auf einer 
irra tiona listisch-mytholog ischen Grund lage; seine 
schoepferische Methode geht in die Richtung des pathetisch-
leeren, deklamatorischen Manifests, der Proklamierung eines 
Scheinaktivismus. Er hat also eine ganze Reihe von 
wesentlichen Zuegen, die die faschistische Literaturtheorie, 
ohne ihnen oder sich einen Zwang anzutun, annehmen konnte. 
(Lukacs 1969: 41) 
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Expressionism is grounded in an irrationalist 
mythology. Its creative style tends towards that of an 
emotive, rhetorical, vacuous manifesto, a declamatory 
pseudo-activism .... [since they [the Expressionists] were 
unable to free themselves from an imperialist 
parasitism, and since they colluded in the ideological ~ 
of the imperialist bourgeoisie without offering either 
criticism or resistence, acting indeed on occasion as its 
vanguard] their creative method could without distortion be 
pressed into the service of that synthesis of decadence and 
atavism which is the demagogy of Fascism. 
(translated by Rodney Livingstone) 
Lukacs did not remain on this generalized level of criticism, 
however. Particularly in his "Realism in the Balance", he 
personalizes his attack, mentioning individual artists, often 
fellow Marxists, as for example Hanns Eisler, in a derogatory 
tone. Not going into a deeper assessment of their work (Eisler's 
was in the domain of music), he discredits it in a reductive, 
minimizing manner in order to demonstrate a particular point he 
is making (Lukacs 1977: 54-55). This drew out reaction from 
writers who rallied round to defend fellow artists. 
I would like to take a closer look at the above quotation. The 
tone being strongly partisan, there is little evidence of any 
attempt at objectivity. Phrases and words such as 'irrationalist 
mythology', 'emotive, rhetorical and vacuous manifesto', can in 
themselves be seen as dismissals of an emotional nature. From 
the point of view of criticism would this invalidate Lukacs' 
attack? If the critic is supposed to make an adequate assessment 
of a work by standing at an 'objective' distance from it, then 
Lukacs' clearly partisan involvement would disqualify his 
judgement. However, looking at it from the point of view of 
Marxism. partisanship is not in itself a reason for 
disqualifi<;ation. Although Marxists speak about a scientific 
approach and about an objective reality, partisanship in the 
handling of it is not excluded; in fact it is an integral part 
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of it. Marx, himself, who insisted that philosophy must not only 
interpret the world but must also change it. insisted on the 
interaction between theory and praxis. Praxis involves taking 
sides. As early as 1843. in his letter to Ruge, he expresses the 
opinion that the only way of arriving at true consciousness is 
to look at realities on the ground by getting involved in the 
struggle, by taking sides (Marx 1992: 210). 
We are now faced with two seemingly mutually exclusive elements 
side by side. We have theory, which must strive towards 
objectivity. On the other hand the acting person. especially the 
revolutionary, is only able to work from a position of 
subjectivity, that is, by taking sides. This includes the 
theorist who is also a revolutionary, actively involved in the 
struggle. Marx begins his inaugural address for the first 
International Worbnen's Association with the words. "Fellow 
Working Men'', including himself as one of them. although he was 
not himself a labourer. Both Lukacs and Brecht work from a 
position of being actively in combat. Lenin. too. supported a 
conscious partisanship. Marxists justify this paradox with the 
following argument: As it has been scientifically established 
that the process of history must inevitably lead to the victory 
of the proletariat and to the establishment of socialism. 
objective judgements can only be made from the standpoint of the 
proletariat. Whoever does not take sides. or takes the side of 
t-he bourgeoisie, cannot possibly see social developments in their 
true light (Stoerig 1950: 405). So if Lukacs speaks from a 
partisan point of view, he could be speaking from a position of 
political involvement. with the confident presupposition that he 
is part of the movement which is in possession of true 
consciousness. As he would be in a pos i tic,n of combat there 
would be no reason to be 'fair' to the enemy. 
What is disturbing about this vision, though, is that it would 
mean that anyone who looked at the world from that one standpoint 
(however commendable the final aim). would, of necessity, be seen 
to have accurate insight, leaving no space for varying ability 
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between different people. A Marxist writer could thus say many 
things with impunity. Lukacs, in fact, denigrates a whole range 
of activity in a uniform, ideological manner, completely 
insensitive to the various aspects of what he is looking at. On 
the other hand, he does not assign that same right to others who 
are in the Marxist movement. He attacks the work of people who 
are committed to the Marxist cause, disqualifying them from the 
status of true followers of that movement. In other words he 
assigns himself the right of being the judge of what Marxism is 
and how it should be conducted, not giving recognition to the 
capability of others. 
I think that it would be a mistake to defend what can only be 
regarded as a hegemonic attitude on the part of Lukacs, as 
displayed in the above quotation, by linking it to the Marxist 
cause. At the most one can link it to the Soviet state which 
officially is based on the Marxist philosophy. From a position 
of power within this state, Lukacs attacks those writers who are 
not its citizens. By polarising the new modernist art movements 
into the opposite of Marxism, Lukacs equates them with the enemy, 
expecting 'true' Marxists to refuse to become engaged in a 
phenomenon which is a substantial part of the modern scene. 
Whether he is defending his own state, or, simply, his own 
literary theory to the exclusion of all others, a distinction 
should be made between this and the Marxist cause in terms Marx, 
who himself combated the dogmatism of the hegemonic Hegelian 
system, which was at that time linked to the power of the state. 
On the other hand, it should be taken into consideration that in 
the light of the issue of partisanship, as I have just discussed, 
Marxist theory in itself possibly lends itself to this kind of 
abuse. 
Lukacs' response to Bloch's attack is to be found in his essay, 
"Realism in the Balance", first published in Das Wort in Moscow 
in 1938. In answer to the critic ism levelled at him he does 
address some primary works specifically, as, for example, the 
interior monologue in James Joyce's Ulysses (negatively) and the 
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handling of the character of Christian in Thomas Mann's 
Buddenbrooks (positively). He repeats his attack on the 
practices of the movements of Naturalism, Express ion ism and 
Surrealism as he attempts to preserve the superior status of 
Realism. First and foremost he insists that realism is the only 
standard by which art must be judged, and assumes that his 
knowledge of realism - and of reality - is the one and only 
correct one. Speaking from a position of partisanship as a 
Marxist, he remarks that anyone who is committed to that movement 
would know what reality is. The implication is that whoever does 
not agree with his opinion cannot be a true Marxist. Continuing 
in this vein he goes beyond the role of a critic who simply 
assesses works of art. He seems confident that he is in a 
position to dictate the criteria according to which 'good' works 
of art should actually be created, notwithstanding the fact that 
he is not an artist himself. 
Lukacs does get stiff opposition from another Marxist writer, 
namely, Brecht. Unfortunately, though, the latter's articles 
(the ones in question in this dissertation) were not published 
at the time when they were written. Thus they did not form part 
of the public debate, and can only be seen in relation to it by 
later critics. A writer himself, who used a diversity of genres, 
Brecht finds Lukacs' rules based on too narrow a parameter, that 
is, the model of the nineteenth century novel. The latter. he 
states, places too much confidence in being able to deduce 
ideological positions from this one genre. He judges this to be 
out of touch with the realities of the twentieth century and its 
scientific developments; developments which have opened up new 
dimensions in terms of the class struggle, the use of mass media, 
and thus the domain of actual artistic production. Brecht sees 
the genres of lyrical poetry and drama as being more conducive 
to experimentation; an element which he insists is of paramount 
importance in all artistic creativity. Furthermore, in his "The 
Essays of G.eorg Lukacs", he points out that the political reality 
of the twentieth century differs from that of the nineteenth 
century. The proletariat has replaced the bourgeoisie as the 
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ascendant class, and as such must be seen as showing the way 
forward into the future (Brecht 1977 69). New art production 
must take its lead from there . He cannot agree with Lukacs that 
one can use the old model of the novel and simply substitute the 
class. According to Brecht, a new reality demands the 
development of new methods of transmission, including the use of 
newly acquired scientific skills. He expresses a feeling of 
constriction in terms of what he sees as Lukacs· formalistic 
hegemony on the creation of art. His view is that the latter is. 
in fact. not engaged in the real issues of the class struggle. 
Instead he sees him to be engaged in an utopian idealism. 
refusing to face the new, current. political challenges. 
It must be pointed out at this stage that Brecht and others are 
not quite accurate ln saying that Lukacs' theory on realism is 
solely based on a few selected novels of the nineteenth century 
and a handful of novels written in the twentieth century along 
the same lines. In the very essay in question Lukacs refers back 
to whom he perceives as the great realists of past ages, like 
Cervantes. Shakespeare and Grimme lshausen (Lukacs 1977:56). 
This. together with the fact that he rates twentieth century 
writers, like Thomas Mann, as a realist implies that he does see 
realism as a general qualitative term which is not exclusively 
bound to the model of the nineteenth century novel and its 
copies. This would support his conviction that realism, 
according to his criteria. can and must continue as a mode of 
representation in every age as a crucial part of the class 
struggle. It should not be relegated to the past. He rejects 
the notion that just because modernism is the more recent 
movement, it follows that it is an improvement on realism. What 
lS clear, however. is that he perceives realism as having reached 
a particularly high standard in terms of an instrument of 
political change in the nineteenth century movement. 
Furthermore, it is the terra in on which he has focused his 
studies for the theory of mediation, and may thus have felt 
particularly qualified to use it in his arguments. 
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What then, according to the essay, "Realism in the Balance", is 
Lukacs' conception of reality? What assumptions does he base it 
on. and how does he perceive the artist and his work? The 
following quotation will serve to throw light on this . 
. . . Every major realist fashions the material given in his own 
experience. and in so doing makes use of techniques of 
abstraction. among others. But his goal is to penetrate the 
laws governing objective reality and to uncover the deeper, 
hidden, mediated, not immediately perceptible network of 
relationships that go to make up society. Since these 
relationships do not lie on the surface, since the underlying 
laws only make themselves felt in very complex ways and are 
realized only unevenly, as trends, the labour of the realist 
is extraordinarily arduous, since it has both an artistic and 
an intellectual dimension. 
(Lukacs1977:38) 
This excerpt could be seen as representati~e in terms, not only 
of touching on the issues contained in the essay as a whole, but 
also on realism in the marxist sense as such. "Major realist" 
can be taken to mean "artist of true importance". that is, 
important in terms of reflecting social reality. Earlier. Lukacs 
defines literature as a particular form by means of which 
objective reality is reflected" (Lukacs 1977:35). He also refers 
to philosophy as a mental reflection of reality (31). This is 
indicative of how closely the cognitive and aesthetic faculties 
are interlinked in his scheme of things. Furthermore, according 
to this excerpt, it is clear that it is not mere reflection that 
is demanded of the writer. Before reality, that is, reality 
according to Lukacs, can be reflected, it first has to be grasped 
in all its depth and implications. In other words, it must be 
grasped in its totality, and then be reflected as thus by means 
artistic creativity. 
I would like, here, to question the use of the word ·reflection' 
(Spiegelu.ng) in Lukacs· artie le. Is this an accurate term for 
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the way of mediation that Lukacs in effect demands of the artist? 
'Spiegel, (mirror). a central image to be found in both modern and 
postmodern art, implies a reflection of the surface. which is 
exactly what Lukacs is fighting against when he criticises the 
art of the Naturalist movement. A mirror effectually blocks all 
exchange between surface and depth. It gives an illusion of 
depth by reflecting only the surface. The above passage talks 
about the realist 'fashioning' (bearbeiten) his experience 
(E.rlebnisstoff). This implies that the material (which he takes 
as a given; i.e.the material of reality) can be made to change 
its shape and thus its face. its surface. When Lukacs talks 
about reflecting reality he is talking about the rendering of a 
secondary, deeper image, the primary, surface one having been 
penetrated to make way for the newly-fashioned 'real' one. In 
other words, the artist reorganises reality in order to expose 
its true nature. Lukacs appears to have no doubt that the 'great 
realist' has the ability not only to fully grasp the one, true. 
hidden. what he calls objective reality, but then also has the 
creative power to fashion this into what looks like a surface 
reality, making it accessible in all its ideological, political 
implication. In other words, according to this text, we are not 
talking about a reflection. but rather. of a presentation of 
something which is not evident to the naked eye; something which 
needs the mediation of the artist to become visible. 
Not only does Lukacs talk about an objective reality, but he also 
implies that it is possible to comprehend this. Furthermore. he 
implies that reality is a whole. In its totality there is 
nothing outside it. Every fragment is, in fact, not a separate 
fragment at all, but a part of an organic whole. The work of 
literature, 'reflecting' this reality truthfully, should thus 
also be an organic whole. When he criticises the Expressionists, 
and other movements, Lukacs judges them. first and foremost on 
their perception and understanding of reality. They are taken 
1.n. he says, by what shows itself to the naked eye, namely, 
surface reality. Responding only to the immediacy of the surface 
experience. they mistake the manifestations of a variety of 
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fragments of the whole for the whole itself, not realizing that 
what looks like fragmentation is actually interconnected and 
interdependent on a deeper level (Lukacs 1977: 39). As reality 
is incorrectly comprehended it is not surprising that the 
reflection of it must be a false one. Montage, which he sees as 
an artificial construction opposed to the organic development 
which is the logical result of an understanding of reality as 
totality, is unacceptable to him. In Lukacs' ideal novel the 
reader should be able to perceive how a character represents a 
type in terms of the social forces that have shaped him and the 
reality in which he has to function while still being an 
individual. To Lukacs the product of montage would be something 
constructed and thus static, incapable of any growth. 
We are now right in the middle of the realm of dialectics. 
Lukacs', as well as Brecht's dialectical vision of reality is in 
line with the Marxist strand of the German philosophical 
tradition. I would like to go back at this stage to look at the 
theories of Marx. However, it would not make sense to look at 
Marx in isolation, that is, without taking account of his 
relations hip to the system of Hegel, which he opposed, but to 
which he nevertheless is indebted in terms of the dialectical 
theory. At the risk of going further back in the tradition than 
is justified by an assessment of the texts of Lukacs and Brecht. 
I nevertheless feel that it is important in terms of this 
discussion as a whole, as it will hopefully serve to clarify some 
of the issues which come up in the works of the later writers as 
we 11. At the same time, due to its vastness, I cannot, of 
course, do justice to the philosophical tradition, but am forced 
to go into it in a very selective manner. 
Consciousness of the subject, and how the latter is linked to 
material life is one of the key issues in Karl Marx's ( 1818 -
1883) work. In the letter to his friend, Arnold Ruge, he 
expresses his intention of showing the world "why it is 
struggling" and showing it that "the consciousness of this is a 
thing ¥1hich it must acquire whether it wishes or not" \Marx 197 5: 
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211). He wrote this at a time when he was disengaging himself 
from the Young Hegelian movement of which he had been a part. 
The Young Hegelians were a group of intellectuals who, originally 
coming from the Hegelian school, opposed that philosophy on the 
strength of new discoveries in the natural sciences, basing their 
arguments on the doctrine of positivism and materialism. They 
challenged Hegel's hierarchy in which philosophy had held the 
highest position in terms of the Absolute Spirit. The Young 
Hegelians rejected religious belief, judging the deity to be a 
creation of man's imagination, a projection of man's desire for 
happiness. Furthermore, they actively opposed what they saw as 
a reactionary state in the political sphere. Their movement 
became that of the political Left in Germany. This was in 
contrast to the Old Hegelians who also opposed Hegel but for 
other reasons, who went on to constitute the political Right. 
In the letter to Ruge, Marx criticises the Young Hegelians for 
what he perceives to be an ineffectiveness in the combat against 
the idealistic system. As he saw it, they were copying the model 
of the very system which they were criticising, attempting to 
bring about change by simply supplanting existing ideas with 
their own new ideas. Marx insisted that engagement with material 
conditions is a prerequisite for the attainment of true 
consciousness and consequently for bringing about change. A 
concept that has not developed out of a knowledge of existing 
material reality can only lead to a false consciousness. 
Material reality, rather than God or idealist concepts, is the 
true source of knowledge. Marx proposes to reform consciousness 
by "analysing mystical consciousness obscure to itself whether 
it appears in religious or political forms" (Marx 1975: 211). 
This is to be done by a critical analysis of the existing 
material order. To truly know a people, according to Marx, one 
must not look at the ideas of the intellectuals of that country, 
but rather at the mode of economic production. As has been 
mentioned earlier, he insisted on a partisan involvement in the 
political struggle on the ground. 
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Although Marx opposed idealism as such, he did not throw out the 
Hegelian system. Rather, he turned it upside down. This is 
evident in the epilogue to the second edition of Das Kapital: 
Fuer Hegel ist de1· Denkprozess, den er sogar unter dem Namen 
Idee in ein selbststaendiges SubJekt verwandelt, der Demiurge 
(Schoepfer, Erzeuger) des Wirklichen ... Bei mir ist umgekehrt 
das ldeelle nichts anderes als das im Nenschenkopf umgesetzte 
und uebersetzte Materielle. 
(Marx 1873: 10) 
(For Hegel, thought process, which he even transforms into an 
independent subject in the guise of the name idea, is the 
demiurge (creator, procreator) of the real .... With me it is 
the opposite: the idea is nothing other than that material 
which has been processed and translated by man·s thought.) 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770 - 1831), according to Hans 
Joachim Stoerig, in his Kleine Weltgeschichte der Philosophie, 
can be seen to be a philosopher in the line of German Idealism. 
The latter can be distinguished from two other lines of thought 
which came to the fore in the wake of the powerful impact of the 
philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724- 1804). The other two are 
Materialism and Positivism, and Romanticism. Kant's system is 
a dualistic one, that is, there is a distinction between the 
world of appearances and the world of things as they are in 
themselves (Ding an sich). Furthermore one can see Kant's theory 
of cognition also to be dualistic. On the one hand there is the 
given (Rohmaterial), and on the other there is the subject, the 
"I" , which is in possess ion of apr ior ic concepts and has the 
ability to categorise. It is only by means of the application 
of the aprioric capacity on the given raw material that knowledge 
is attained. (There will be more on Kant in Chapter 2.) 
Each of the three strands which can be seen to have developed out 
of Kant's philosophy, related itself to one specific aspect of 
his system without necessarily subscribing to others. Positivism 
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and Materialism based itself on the empiricist' component of 
Kant's system in which he argues that science and knowledge is 
only possible in the domain of appearances. There the role of 
philosophy is limited to one of synthesizing knowledge as 
developed by science. Romanticism protested against the 
rationalistic spirit in Kant's sytem, pointing out the existence 
of the irrational forces in man and the world, claiming the 
rights and the worth of the individual. German Idealism 
emphasizes that part of Kant's philosophy which deals with the 
creative power of the subject through which the concepts of world 
and nature are brought into being. This leads to a line of 
thought in which consciousness, that is, the creative "I", is the 
central issue. According to Kant, this "I" projects itself into 
the realm of freedom. Freedom comes into its own in the realms 
of ethics and religion. It materializes itself in history, which 
Kant sees as a process of development towards the infinite goal 
of the realization of freedom. German Idealism follows this line 
of thought, that is, it puts the creative subject first, moving 
towards freedom, which becomes materialized in history (Stoerig 
1950: 305). 
Hegel's direct predecessors 
Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling. 
are Joh. Gottlieb Fichte and 
Apart from these, though, he had 
a high regard for the teachings of the ancient Greek philosopher. 
Heraclitus (ca. 500 BC). The latter was of the opinion that 
strife is the basic condition of the natural world, in which the 
unity of things does not lie in material substance. but in a 
delicate balance of tension of opposing forces. Closer to 
Hegel's own time, Fichte emphasized the creative ability of the 
will. He differed from Kant on the point of the latter's Ding 
an sich, seeking to deduce the whole phenomenon of life from one 
paramount dialectical principle: The first step is for the "I" 
to establish itself (setzen). This, on its own, however does not 
bring about evolvement. What is missing is a moving energising 
factor. As the "I" cannot evolve without resistance, there must 
be a "non- I" . In other words, the first step would be the 
establishment of the "I", which he calls the thesis, while the 
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second step would be the contradiction, that is, the antithesis. 
The third stage is the synthesis in which both the opposites 
remain, neither being excluded. They do not remain in full 
force, however, each one of them having their effect curtailed. 
According to Fichte, then, the opposition between thesis and 
antithesis dissappears in synthesis by partially limiting the 
full effect of each CStoerig 1950:320). 
Hegel takes the dialectical principle further at the point of 
synthesis. Thesis and antithesis are no longer curtailed in 
synthesis. Instead they have become sublated. In the place of 
synthesis comes Aufhebung. The German word aufheben has a three-
fold meaning and could itself be seen as an embodiment of Hegel's 
dialectical principle. One meaning is "to rescind", "to annul", 
"to render void". The second meaning is almost its opposite: "to 
keep", "to safeguard", "to reserve". The third meaning is "to 
lift up", "to raise", "to elevate". Sublation implies that 
thesis and antithesis are no longer limited as a result of a 
collision, but are lifted onto a higher level where they no 
longer manifest themselves as exclusive opposites. 
In the domain of logic Hegel does not regard the forms and the 
content of human thought. Rather. he looks at the spirit, the 
idea, as in a condition of being itself, outside time and space. 
Concepts and logical principles are not only precepts of thought 
but are also essences in themselves. As we move dialectically, 
developing one concept out of another, we do not develop this out 
of ourselves but simply act as onlookers observing the self-
development of these concepts; rather like the scientist observes 
the self-development of natural forms, or the histiographer 
observes the self-evolvement of the historical process. In his 
logic Hegel begins by saying that 'being· is at the same time the 
most universal and the most empty of concepts. If one were to 
ask the question what this 'being· is in its most universal form. 
one realizes that wherever one looks one sees only particular 
'being·. However, if a being is stripped of all determination 
it is actually a 'nothing'. It is nothing real but only a 
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universal thought which is what 'nothing' is as well. In this 
way one proceeds from 'being' to its apparent contradiction, 
'nothing'. Likewise, as each concept is systematically analyzed 
there follows another concept. Hegel resolves the contradiction 
between 'being' and 'nothing' in the concept of 'becoming' . From 
this beginning he moves on to evolve the whole chain of concepts 
striving towards the supreme concept of the Absolute Spirit 
CStoerig 1950:322). 
Marx does not take over Hegel's dialectic in its entirety. He 
makes a distinction between form and content. He makes use of 
the form of the dialectic movement as the dynamic. revolutionary 
principle, the foundational thought being that the world does not 
consist of complexes of finished things. but rather of processes. 
As far as the content is concerned, however, Marx. as has been 
mentioned. replaces Hegel's with its opposite, that is, he 
replaces the idea with material. 
Movement belongs to the essence of dialectical materialism. 
However. it is important to note here that the word 'materialism' 
underwent a shift of meaning for twentieth century Marxists. 
Since Marx, s time scientific developments have challenged the 
validity of philosophy as such. and in particular the concept of 
'rna ter ia l' . The understanding of rna ter ia l had been something 
graspable; something that consisted of atoms which were 
irreducible and unchangeable. It has since been discovered that 
the atom, in turn, consists of tiny elemental particles. that it 
can be split, and that there are complicated interrelations 
between the partie les. There is a realization that there is 
still much, some of which is as yet undiscovered. which cannot 
simply be fitted into an easily comprehensible order. In short. 
the concept of material has become multifarious and tenuous. 
Lenin. who. after Marx and Engels. is responsible for laying the 
foundation of Marxist philosophy, realized that scientific 
development would pose a threat to the development of a 
ma~erialist philosophy. He rejected the older, now too narrow 
concept of material. For his purposes he reformulated it to mean 
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a philosophical category which refers to objective reality" 
(Stoerig 1950: 406). 
The understanding is that there can be no material without 
movement, and no movement without material. Movement covers 
every kind of change, that is, not only the movement of bodies 
in space, but also physical, chemical, physiological and. most 
important. social and historical processes. This movement goes 
in an upward direction. Starting at the bottom it moves to 
phenomena of higher orders to eventually manifest itself ln 
soc ia 1 processes and consciousness. The dialect ica 1 development. 
in line with how Hegel explains it, does not only move 
quantitatively. It also moves from the quantitative to the 
qualitative providing a certain limit has been crossed. In 
contrast to Hegel's view, however, that history is a 
manifestation of the objective spirit, making use of individuals 
in its inevitable movement, Marxists see the course of history 
being actively created and influenced by people. 
Wher~ Luk.3.cs talks about 
movement. that is. the 
dialectically towards the 
movement he talks about ciialectical 
inevitable movement that progresses 
fulf ilrnent of a complete state of 
socialism. Brecht. too, 
the proletariat in the 
believes in the inevitable triumph of 
class struggle, confident that he, 
himself. was living in the age of "the final struggle between the 
bourgeois and the proletarian class" (Brecht 1977: 77). In line 
with Marx, both speak from the position of being preoccupied with 
the aim of changing the world. that is, of combating those 
phenomena which blockade this inevitable movement towards 
socialism. On the other hand. capitalism, the enemy of this 
process, is seen as growing from strength to strength. Fascism. 
seen as the most extreme manifestation 6f capitalism is, as it 
were. taking over Europe. If a false consciousness of objective 
reality in terms of the nature of capitalism is produced, be it 
for whatever reason (lack of insight or deliberate. ideological 
misrepresentation of the truth for political reasons), then this, 
in turn. bampers socio-political betterment. The existence of 
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the totality of capitalism. its power structures, and the 
different ways in which these are camouflaged. constitutes 
objective reality for both Lukacs and Brecht. The aim is to 
unmask this reality in whatever guise it appears in order to make 
way for the true. socialist state. Lukacs, having actively taken 
the combat into the sphere of literature. stresses that it is 
imperative that a work of art has movement. meaning the 
dialectical movement between surface and depth in the perception 
of reality. He criticizes what he sees to be the lack of 
movement both in naturalistic art and expressionistic art, 
implying that these works constitute a cover up, obstructing 
access to the real underlying truth. 
In the light of this it is ironic that Lukacs should be attacked 
for what could be seen as forcing a stasis in literary 
deve loprnent f c•r the writers of the Left. One could as 1:: the 
question whether his parameters allow for any space for the 
production of new works of art in terms of variety and 
innovation. If there is only the one reality which fits into the 
vision of Socialist Realism. and thus has already been penetrated 
by the theorists of its proponents. what is there left tc• be 
discovered for the individual artist? If on top of this the form 
has also been laid down by Lukacs· criteria. then little space 
is left for any further innovation. An artist would be forced 
to move into an oppositional attitude to become creative. This 
places the writer of the Left. like Brecht, who is on the same 
side as Lukacs on the political level. into a dilemma. As a 
t1arxist artist he cannot dissociate his subject matter from 
politics, that is, he cannot simply write about other things. 
He would also want to close ranks with fellow-Marxist in the 
struggle. But as Lukacs' precepts are so constricting, he would 
be forced to oppose him to be innovatively productive. It is 
noteworthy that the works brought forward by Lukacs as models of 
the ideal of realistic art are all by authors that are outside 
the Soviet system. Nobody prescribed to those authors as to how 
they must write. Balzac. Tolstoy and Thomas Mann were not even 
Marxists in a broader sense of the term. This may be an 
indication that if artists are put into a framework stipulated 
by a political system, which, amongst other things, would mean 
that their work has to be supportive of that system, they may 
have difficulty in producing anything new and significant. 
I would like to consider a particular point here; something that 
comes up frequently, namely, the position of art and that of the 
artist in society. While the criticism of capitalism and the 
total rejection of Fascism is clearly stated by both sides of 
this debate, there is nothing said about the totalitarian nature 
of the Soviet state. Presumably this is because the latter has 
the ·right· doctrine of Marxism as its base. In Lukacs· terms 
artists within the Soviet system would presumably not be allowed 
to be critical of that system. In other words. Lukacs combats 
an enemy that exists outside his own system. Within his own 
state he does not play an oppositional role, himself being a 
functionary upholding it. Brecht, on the other hand, because of 
his particular situation. is truly oppositional in as far as he 
opposes the ruling system in his own country. The two join hands 
in attacking that particular system. This raises the question 
whether a Marxist system, in the eyes of th8 two writers in 
question, once established and in power, assigns art a critical 
role in its society, or whether it is presumed that there will 
be nothing left to criticise; that the accumulation and abuse of 
power would stop. Alternatively, would the right to criticise 
be assigned to a different section of society? This question 
comes up again later in postmodernist discussions, in which 
Lyotard, for example, sees the oppositional position of art as 
essential if totalitarianism is to be avoided, while there is 
another trend which would release art from this oppositional 
vocation. A question which would arise then could be whether 
artistic products will have any significance beyond that of 
decoration and craft. 
Variety and innovation are not the point of Lukacs' concern, 
however. What concerns him is not the work of art for its own 
sake, but how effective it is in furthering the class struggle. 
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For example, he did not mind that Balzac's political views were 
what he called reactionary. What concerned him was the 
development of an aesthetic theory which would be in line with 
his own political system, and which could actively be employed 
in its service. He took what he saw to be useful in the novels 
of his choice, and made this the cornerstone of his own theory. 
What is important to him when regarding these novels is that. in 
spite of being fiction, he could see them as the embodiment of 
a polemic in terms of a particular class struggle: the struggle 
being, in their case, that of the bourgeoisie against the 
aristocracy. They contained the characteristics which he saw as 
indispensable; socio-political reality portrayed as an organic 
whole, the nove 1 itself created as an organic whole, and the 
characters portrayed as types produced by, and representative of 
their social class. He justified his approval of the works of 
Thomas Mann on the basis that although the latter portrayed the 
bourgeoisie (and not the proletariat, which had by then become 
the ascendant class), he did not idealise the latter, but. 
rather. pointed out its decadence. My suggestion is that what 
we see here is an example of the Hegelian way of looking at the 
historical process. Lukacs' assessment of the nineteenth century 
novel as a model for furthering the class struggle in spite of 
the fact that the authors were of another political persuasion, 
implies that the latter's work was made use of by the inevitable 
historical process without them even being fully aware of it. 
We are still left with the problem of the production of art 
worlr.s. It appears that Lukacs ignored the realities involved in 
the making and in the transmitting. Furthermore, one of the 
problems encountered when art has to serve a particular doctrine. 
that is. when it has to be in service of a political movement, 
is that as the artifact is not seen as important in its own 
right. non-experts who may be in a position of power in the 
movement as a whole assign themselves the right to determine what 
artists must do. The artist thus loses his status in terms of 
creativity, becoming more of a serving craftsman. Lukacs, a 
theorist, chose works which were already completed and presumed 
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that their framework could simply be copied and filled with the 
content of his choosing. On the other hand, the reality may be 
that a writer has the desired political view but may not be able 
to produce on demand and according to prescribed rules. 
Furthermore, a work of art or literature has to be accessible to 
the people on whom it is supposed to make an impact. This 
attribute is something that has to be tried out in practice to 
be developed. Brecht criticises Lukacs heavily on this 
particular aspect. 
In line with Marxist thought, Brecht appears to be more or less 
in agreement with Lukacs as far as the understanding of reality 
is concerned, that is, he assumes that there is one objective 
reality. Like Lukacs he sees the function of art as being 
combative in socio-political terms, unmasking the truth about the 
pervasive existence of capitalistic power structures, thus 
bringing about true consciousness which will then bring about 
socio-political change in real terms. What he disagrees with has 
to do with the efficacy of the method of transmission. He 
resents the oppressive imposition of what he sees to be an 
excessive emphasis on formal theories in the domain of art 
production. As a theatre practitioner, who always conducted his 
work in such a way that there was an immediate interaction 
between theory and praxis, he was critical of the tendency of 
intellectuals to make ideological analyses by employing methods 
which needed no external verification. 
Brecht, speaking from a position of abundant experience. was 
convinced that a realistic work of art could not even get off the 
ground without the elements of pleasure and fun. Pleasure, in 
terms of discovering reality, in terms of creating the work, and 
in terms of spectator enjoyment, is a vital agent in the process 
of transmission. Linked to this is his famous element of ease 
(Leichtigkeit). In his !1essingkauf Dialogues he states that one 
can achiev~ any amount of seriousness within ease, but none 
without it (Brecht 1965: 94). Ease is brought about by a high 
degree of proficiency on the part of the artist and the ensemble 
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in the performance of their work, giving the impression of there 
being no effort. To practice art at all in the grim political 
conditions of the day, says Brecht, needed a great deal of 
courage; the kind of courage needed by someone dane ing on a 
volcano. Brecht compares the combination of courage and ease 
needed by performers and writers to that needed by circus 
artists. The theatre was Brecht's central domain. He 
revolutionized the latter, integrating the literary with staging 
techniques, even allowing for an interchangeability of form and 
content. While variety and innovation were not primary concerns 
for Lukacs, Brecht saw them to be indispensable in terms of a 
work of art reaching the audience. Constantly experimenting with 
new methods, he documented these experiments and worked out 
theories. Those theories were in turn applied to praxis, in the 
process of which they were tested and used for further 
experimentation. This working method can be seen to be closer 
to Marx's dialectic thinking in term of a constant interaction 
between theory and praxis in order to reach true consciousness; 
closer, that is, than that of Lukacs, who tried to solve and 
contro 1 everything by way of his theory. One of Brecht's 
criticisms of Lukacs' method is that the latter takes specific 
novels as his models, rather than real life situations (Brecht 
1977: 85). 
Brecht's work and theories cannot be divorced from the concerns 
of Expressionism. Although he committed himself to Marxism as 
a writer and theatre practitioner, his earlier link with the 
expressionistic mode of production continued to play a part in 
his subsequent work. Already at an early age, Brecht had been 
freely in touch with all the cultural and political currents of 
his age. The most prominent movement was that of Expressionism. 
Critics judge his early plays, like Drums in the Night, In the 
Jungle of the Cities and Baal to have strong expressionistic 
features. His commitment to the Marxist world view carne about 
in the late Twenties after having studied the works of Marx. By 
that stage he had quite a substantial body of work behind him; 
work which had reached performance at major theatres and had 
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attracted much critical attention. 
Expressionism is a term invented by critics to describe an art 
movement, mainly in painting, which flourished in the early 
1900s. The style first began to come to the fore at the end of 
the nineteenth century with artists from various countries such 
as Vincent van Gogh, Paul Gaugin, James Ensor and Edvard Munch. 
Die Bruecke, represented by Emil Nolde and Ernst Ludwig Kirchner 
was the first group to promote the expressionist idea. This was 
followed by the more influential Der Blaue Reiter with people 
like Wassily Kandinsky, Paul Klee and Franz Marc. These groups, 
through their painting as well as writing about it, influenced 
a number of artists, among which are Marc Chagall, George Grosz 
and Oskar Kokoschka (Wadsworth 1984: 354). 
The Expressionistic style of painting was seen to be a reaction 
to, and a development out of the previous movement of 
Impressionism, the latter being concerned with the surface 
appearance of objects, that is, with truth or beauty as it is 
perceived by the eye. To the Expressionists, however, truth or 
beauty was in the mind, and not in the eye. They tried to give 
form to the artist's strong inner feeling, that is, they tried 
to portray life as modified by their highly personal 
interpretation of reality. Expressionist paintings often tended 
to be somber, painful, and even grotesque as they often reflected 
the unhappiness of the artist (Wadsworth 1984: 354). 
Expressionism also influenced literature, particularly in the 
domain of drama. August Strindberg of Sweden is seen by some as 
the forerunner in terms of new dramatic forms and stage 
techniques. Expressionist drama first developed as a movement 
in Germany, reaching its height in the years following World War 
I in the plays of Ernst Toller, Frank Wedekind and Georg Kaiser. 
Characters were often shown in a one sided way, standing for 
single ideas and attitudes. Usually they are placed into 
situations in which the objects of the outer world are distorted 
to reveal the tortured minds of either the characters or the 
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author. These effects were achieved by symbolic settings, 
unnatural lighting and non-realistic ways of acting. The 
influence of psychology is often evident in as far as the inner 
frustrations of the dramatist is often reflected in characters 
that are in the grip of intense emotions (Wadsworth 1984: 354). 
Although Expressionism did not have political involvement as its 
goal, the movement did display strong anti-war sentiments. 
Furthermore, the conventional bourgeois way of life was seen in 
a very negative light. 
To this one can add the marked Nietzschean influence in the sense 
of the latter's positive nihilism, the will to power, the 
overdimensional person, the notion of beyond good or evil. As 
this discussion is not about Expressionism itself but rather on 
how Lukacs and Brecht responded to its exponents, I shall not go 
any deeper into Nietzsche· s philosophy. What is interesting 
here, though, is that in terms of what has just been described, 
Brecht's early plays certainly show signs of this influence, as 
for example, the strong anti-militaristic and anti-bourgeois 
drive, the oversized, amoral, nihilistic character of Baal, and 
the scene in the bar in Drums in the Night, which displays 
characteristics of a hell-like hereafter with its heat, wind and 
red moon. Another point of interest is the view on reality. 
Although there is also the assumption that one objective reality 
exists, the artist has the freedom to reflect this reality in a 
highly personal, individualistic way. This implies that what is 
being reflected is a particular artist's interpretation of 
reality. What is also implied is that the artist is free to 
select those sections of reality which are of importance to him 
personally, leading to a subjectively constructed. selective. 
'patched-up' expression. 
Lukacs· critic ism in terms of a lack of totality comes in on this 
point. As has been shown, his ideal art work is the one which 
takes the .whole of reality into account and 'fashions' the 
experience of it to make it accessible in its totality. I think 
it must be noted here that, whatever the claims. the resulting 
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works of both approaches are. as it were. the products of an 
active intervention with the experience of reality; whether the 
work is seen as an organic whole or as a result of montage. The 
difference is that according to Lukacs' view the claim is made 
that true reality is wholly reflected, whereas that is not the 
case with the Expressionists. The latter never hide the fact 
that they are projecting an interpretation (which is in effect 
what Lukacs' artist also does), the difference being that Lukacs' 
artist 'fashions' according to a specific model, while the 
Expressionist makes use of montage amongst other things, freeing 
himself from all prescribed models. Another difference lies in 
the final aim. The Expressionists are not primarily working 
towards a socio-economic revolution. Their main emphasis lies 
in revolutionizing the accepted forms of representation. rather 
than finding the means to change society in Marxist terms. 
Insisting on the sovereignty of the aesthetic realm. they aim to 
burst out of the constriction imposed on art by previous 
conventions. 
It lS this revolutionary and liberating principle in art 
production which is clearly attractive to Brecht. Having, 
amongst other things, gone through an 'expressionistic' phase. 
he does not want to abandon the exciting, progressive elements 
when developing his own art. To him there seems to be no reason 
why all of this cannot be exploited to serve the Marxist socio-
political mission. Modernist developments had done much to clear 
the space for new art production. Brecht did not want to see 
this space clogged up again by rules imposed by people who were 
theorists rather than artists, even though he was in agreement 
with their political direction. According to him. the display 
of surface phenomena and the use of montage is not necessarily 
in conflict with a belief ln an underlying socio-political 
totality, or with the aim of unmasking capitalistic lies. He was 
not of the opinion that the modernist mode of production would 
preclude a work from being realistic. 
Besides the Marxist interpretation of realism, there were also 
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other theories on this subject. It is not possible here to go 
into all of these, but I will put forward a particular one which 
I see to be interesting in terms of Brecht. Not only is it an 
example of another opinion which does not separate realism from 
modernism, but it is also of interest in terms of Brecht's 
development and use of the alienation technique; a characteristic 
which features prominently in all his work. Furthermore, it can 
be taken as a point of comparison when looking at Lyotard's and 
Habermas' interpretations of the Avant-garde later in this 
dissertation. 
The Russian formalist theorist, Roman Jakobson, in his article, 
"On Realism in Art", which appeared in a Czech translation in 
1921, primarily puts the term 'realism' under scrutiny as he 
strives to give various literary terms a more rigorous 
definition. 
What is realism as understood by the theoretician of art? It 
is an artistic trend which aims at conveying reality as 
closely as possible and strives for maximum verisimilitude. 
(Jakobson 1971: 38) 
It is clear from this passage that there is the underlying 
assumption that reality as such does exist and that the aim of 
realism is to convey it. Unlike Lukacs, Jakobson does not use 
the word 'reflect'. Furthermore, he differs from the latter's 
opinion in so far as he allows for a variety of possibilities as 
to how the term 'realism' can validly be applied to a work of 
art. The term could simply apply to a work which is 
representative of the one separate artistic movement, namely, 
that of the nineteenth century. Looking at the artifact itself 
the term could refer to the vision and the intent of the author. 
It could also refer to the perception of the person judging it. 
Concerning.the question of verisimilitude, Jakobson points out 
that although a term like that could conceivably almost make 
sense in the visual domain (in spite of the fact that what is 
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presented is still only an illusion of a faithfulness to reality) 
verisimilitude cannot work in the domain of language (Jakobsen 
1971: 39). I would like to compare this to the point I made 
earlier about the problematic use of the word 'reflection' in 
terms of representation. According to Jakobsen, every attempt 
to render reality faithfully, even a reflection of the surface, 
can never be anything other than a translation of rea 1 i ty itself . 
Translation presupposes interpretation. From this one can 
conclude that not only is there always a subjectivity involved 
on the part of the artist (the interpreter), but also on the part 
of the viewer as we 11. The concepts of 'reflect ion' and 
'verisimilitude, are problematic when they are employed to 
describe what must always be an interpretation, namely, a work 
of art. 
If, in the light of Jakobsen's considerations, one were now to 
compare Expressionism with Lukacs' theory, one could come to the 
conclusion that the former seems to have accepted this difficulty 
inherent in representation itself. and has abandoned any claim 
to convey reality either objectively or totally. Lukacs' theory, 
on the other hand, still clings to the assumption that a uniform 
perception of reality is possible, and only needs a standard form 
to transmit it. If one were to view this in the 1 ight of 
Jakobsen's implication that reality is experienced subjectively 
(which could be interpreted as a move in the direction of a 
later, postmodernist view of there being no, one, objective 
reality), and can thus only be conveyed and received 
subjectively, then one could venture to conclude that the 
perception of reality as well as its transmission in Lukacs' 
theory (which is the one espoused by Socialist Realism) must also 
be a subjective one. Only in this case it would not be the 
subjectivity of an individual artist, but rather that of the 
official party ideology of the Soviet state. The ruling party 
thus assigns itself the power to interpret and disseminate 
reality. 
Turning to the matter of conveying reality as closely as possible 
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Jakobson describes what he sees to be the modernist use of the 
'estrangement effect' In an attempt to transmit reality, he 
says, the artists of the nineteenth century, producing in the 
mode of realism, attempted to reach a maximum degree of 
verisimilitude. This conventional, traditional aspect of 
painting, or writing, conditioned our act of perception. As the 
tradition accumulated, the painted image became an ideogram. a 
formula to which the object portrayed is linked by contiguity. 
Recognition becomes instantaneous. with the result that we no 
longer 'see' the picture. In order for us to see, the ideogram 
needs to become deformed. that is. the artist- innovator must 
impose a new form upon our perception in order to draw our 
attention to something which has gone unnoticed. This can be 
done in a number of ways, as for example. by presenting the 
object from an unusual perspective, or by violating the rules of 
composition as canonised by the artist's predecessors (Jakobson 
1971: 39). With this depiction of the estrangement effect. 
Jakobson explains the strange, abstract features which 
characterise the artifacts of the Avant-garde. Instead of 
excluding Expressionistic works from being realistic. Jakobson 
seems to be of the opinion that they constitute a more advanced 
stage of realism than the works produced in the nineteenth 
century movement. 
The estrangement effect is a step towards forcing spectators to 
participate by thinking in a creative manner. It is this aspect 
which Brecht exploited for his art. First one has to puzzle out 
what it is that is represented, and then one has to conjecture 
why it is presented in this extraordinary manner. Another aspect 
is the element of shock that goes with it. The estranged form 
1s usually not beautiful in the usual sense. Quite often use is 
made of an aesthetics of ugliness. But whatever the particular 
effect is, it causes an interruption in the spectator's 
expectation, forcing him to pause and reflect; to 'see anew'; to 
reassess habi tua 1 perceptions. This takes us into the realms 
of association and connotation, something Brecht was to make use 
of. and what was to become an important issue in the work of the 
32 
post-structuralist, Roland Barthes. In express ion ist art, co lour 
and its associations play an enormous role. Brecht, in his "On 
the Formalistic Character of the Theory of Realism" remarks on 
how what he calls elements of form, like colour, lines, gestures 
and inflections may already be there before the linear content 
of what he wants to say has been fully conceived. In other 
words, there can be a reversal in the sequence of the productive 
process. The associations attached to certain elements of form. 
can lead to the discovery of the content. With the notion of 
this reversal, Brecht (possibly inadvertantly) touches on 
something which was to play a role in later, post-structuralist 
thinking. Barthes, in his S/Z, uncovers what he sees to be the 
power which an author assumes over the reader when deciding first 
on the content and then employing a form to transmit it. The 
assumption is that he, the author, is in possession of the truth. 
In "The Formalistic Character of the Theory of Realism" Brecht 
points out how stifling this theory is as a whole for the artist 
who is creating a new work. Focussing on the word 'formalistic'. 
which is the word Lukacs makes use of when denigrading 
expressionist art, Brecht takes the latter to task by suggesting 
that his use of the word does not make sense (Brecht 1977: 71). 
First of all he states that as form is an integral part of any 
work of art, it is particularly important to define what is meant 
by 'formalistic'. In one sense it can refer to everything that 
makes a work of art unrealistic. He implies that Lukacs uses it 
in that sense, and presumably alludes to the latter's disapproval 
of a 'constructed' opposed to an organic work of art. In 
another sense it refers to a manner of production in which form 
dominates the content to the detriment of the latter. For 
example, something untrue or irrelevant is said to fit into a 
rhyme. He then points out that neither of these uses of the word 
is satisfactory as there are a number of works which, to his 
mind, are unrealistic which would not fit into either of these 
categories, Conversely, a prominent display of form does not 
necessarily make a work unrealistic. A new criterion must be 
found. Characteristically, Brecht turns to 'everyday life' to 
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see how the expression is used there. If someone says "Formally 
he is right", then he means that that person is not really right, 
but is right according to a particular form. Similarly, if 
someone says "Formally the task is solved", he means that the 
task is not solved. To do something to 'preserve the form' means 
that what is being done is not important in itself. Brecht sees 
National Socialism as an example of political formalism; it is 
a socialism in form only (Brecht 1977: 72). 
These examples seem to imply that Brecht would call something 
formalistic when there is a discrepancy between form and content; 
form covers up a diverging or missing content. In fact we are 
talking about a cover-up; a splitting away of the form from 
reality. In other words, a work could be written to fit into the 
realistic form as prescribed by Lukacs, but could be lacking in 
realism in its underlying content. On the other hand a work may 
be truly realistic, according to Brecht, but may have a totally 
different form to the Lukacsian model. Brecht suggests that if 
'formalistic' is used in this sense, then it can be used as a 
yardstick for assessing phenomena like the avant-garde in terms 
of realism. Furthermore, it can be used to look critically at 
a particular style of criticism (meaning that of Lukacs). 
exposing it as being formalistic, because as it is dedicated to 
a particular form of writing, it attempts to solve matters of 
literary creation purely in literary terms, that is, without 
truly engaging in the reality of the current historical process. 
While Brecht does not subscribe to all aspects of Expressionism 
he pays tribute to its variety of form and its courage in terms 
of experimentation (Brecht 1977: 74). 
Concerning the mixture of styles within one work. another aspect 
criticised by Lukacs on formalistic grounds, Brecht points out 
that this method can be particularly effective in politically 
engaged literature. It is easier to openly separate plot and 
editorial, _giving each their full status, instead of trying to 
dissolve the editorial into the plot, or vica versa, which 
usually works out to the detriment of one or the other. The plot 
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can be interrupted when necessary by the editorial without a 
deterioration of artistic quality. Brecht points to the example 
of the chorus in the ancient Greek tragedies (Brecht 1977: 75). 
With the mixture of styles it is possible to display various 
perspectives through different voices, thus leaving space for 
spectator participation. In fact, Brecht's theatre is an 
embodiment of just that. I will now interrupt the discussion of 
Brecht's attack on Lukacs to expand on how he functions in 
practice. I have gathered the following material mainly from his 
plays, his documented production of Die Antigone des Sophokles. 
and from The !1essingkauf Dialogues. The latter consists of a 
collection of discussions about the nature of the theatre set out 
in the form of what can be seen as Socratic dialogues. 
Brecht's use of the estrangement effect, which he integrates with 
his dialectic. is already evident in his early plays. To take 
an example. Drums in the Night contains a number of 
expressionistic 'estrangement' features. For one thing there is 
the non-realistic use of colour in the attempt to express the 
intense emotions of the characters. The dialectic is at play 
between the overt plot and the covert underlying parable; in this 
case. an inverted version of The Prod iga 1 Son. The inverted 
version of the parable is furthermore in dialectical tension with 
the well-known version ln the mind of the spectator; the 
inversion constituting the crucial estrangement effect in the 
play as a whole. In this play. the young Brecht expresses his 
outrage at the rotten. bourgeois way of life in Germany, based, 
as he sees it, on the blood of the young men that are sent to 
their deaths in the war. However. in spite of this sc)cial and 
moral content. the play does not promote a way out of this state 
of affairs. It remains an outraged expression. 
After he embraced Marxism. however. Brecht could be seen to have 
regrounded the estrangement effect. developing it into his 
Alienation Technique, no longer used as a means of mere 
expression. but rather to be put into the service of actively 
furthering socio-political change in Marxist terms. First and 
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foremost he needed to wake up his audience out of habitual lines 
of thought and perception. In line with the aim underlying 
Lukacs· theory of mediation, Brecht does not want his spectators, 
after having initially involved them, to lose themselves either 
in content identification or analysis; especially not in 
character identification. This would blockade the perception of 
the underlying power dynamics. To prevent this identification, 
he contrives various methods of counteracting involvement with 
the story or with the characters on stage. Constantly he reminds 
people of the theatricality of what they are seeing; making them 
aware that they are not looking at 'real' happenings, but at one 
of many examples of situations which they can relate to their own 
life. In other words, he breaks down the illusion of reality 
within the theatre. This is in contrast to what is usually done, 
namely to use every possible device to create the illusion of 
reality. Furthermore, Brecht breaks· down narrative tens ion, thus 
freeing the spectator from the desire of finding out how the 
story ends. This enables him to look carefully at the dynamic 
on stage; to look at the 'how' rather than at the 'what'. For 
instance, the individual scenes are given headings, little 
abstracts, as it were, of what is going to happen. These 
headings are often announced either by a narrator or chorus, both 
of which also comment on the happenings on stage, thus actively 
interrupting the flow of the action, as well as putting the 
spectator into the disturbing position of having to assess plot 
and commentary side by side. The audience is often addressed 
directly. In this way a conscious spectator position is made 
possible. The shock effect, often only in terms of presenting 
something in an unexpected way, is constantly at work, just in 
case the audience's need to identify themselves with what lS 
presented does take over. Scenery is non-realistic. Often it 
stands in dialectic contrast to what is happening on stage. The 
same goes for the music. The actors, extremely versatile, often 
act in a stylized fashion, even doubling up roles, constantly 
reminding the spectator that he is looking at an actor who is 
demonstrating what a character might do; that he is not looking 
at the character himself. The aim is to prod the spectator into 
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comparing what he sees with situations in his own life, 
encouraging him to be creative in devising methods of improving 
this. 
I think that this brief description of Brecht's work in terms of 
praxis demonstrates what can perhaps be seen as the major 
difference between his attitude and that of Lukacs. Brecht shows 
optimism in the ability of other people, allowing for creative 
activity not only on the part of his collaborators, but on that 
of his spectators as well. In his "Popularity and Realism" he 
expresses the opinion that the only real ally in the combat 
against capitalism is that section of the population which is the 
victim of it. that is, the proletariat (Brecht 1977: 80). In his 
case this was not a mere theoretical contemplation. He believed 
in actively engaging the worker in the combat. To begin with 
this meant that he would have to first reach and address him. 
Ideally he would have always liked to have performed to an 
audience consisting of workers . The theatre, however, was a 
bourgeois consumer institution. Workers did not easily come into 
the auditorium. Before his exile. in particular when he was 
performing his didactic plays ( Lehrstuecke). Brecht did make the 
effort to move his performances out of the auditorium onto 
workers' platforms and school stages. He also drew workers into 
the actual production and sounded them out as to what they found 
effective. 
The article "Popularity and Realism" gives us some idea of 
Brecht's underlying thought in the effort to reach the workers. 
from where he felt real change would inevitably come. His alm 
was to use his art to rouse them into revolutionary action. The 
above article is a response to Lukacs' view of genuine popular 
culture as ··a manifold relationship to every aspect of the life 
of one's own people as it has developed in its own individual way 
in the course of history'' (Lukacs 1977: 57). Against this, 
Brecht sets his own specific sense of the word 'popular'. He 
carefully distinguishes what he believes it should mean from the 
sense in which he perceives it to have been used incorrectly; not 
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only incorrectly, but in a consciously deceitful manner. The 
latter rests on a concept of 'the people' which represents them 
as having unchanging characteristics, hallowed traditions, art 
forms, hereditary enemies and invincible power. In that sense. 
there is no question of there being any opposition practised by 
these people against their oppressors. They are perceived as 
accepting their lot. Brecht actively opposes this particular 
meaning of 'the people' as well that of 'popular' based on it, 
seeing it as carrying the implication of ahistoricity and stasis. 
He insists that to bring about change, the masses of people who 
are the producers in society (the proletariat), must "actively 
usurp the course of history, force its pace and determine its 
direction" (Brecht 1977: 81). Seen from this perspective 
'popular· acquires an aggressive meaning, associated with a 
fighting people who change the world and themselves. 
It is impossible to gauge the impact of Brecht's work outside 
the domain of the theatre in revolutionary terms. As a result 
of his prolonged term of exile, he did not have much choice as 
to where his plays could be performed. According to Martin 
Esslin in his Brecht: A Choice of Evils, his work did not enjoy 
recognition in the Soviet bloc. Although he worked and lived in 
East Berlin after he came back from exile, his productions had 
most of their performances in the West, on the whole played in 
front of bourgeois audiences. The revolutionary impact of his 
work can, however, be clearly seen in the domain of the theatre; 
be it in the writing of plays or in the actual staging. 
To sum up this discussion on Lukacs and Brecht I would like to 
highlight those aspects which I perceive the two to have in 
common, to then also consider those which I perceive to be 
radically divergent. What unites the two authors is the combat 
against capitalism, and in particular. against fascism. 
Furthermore they share the Marxist vision in terms of an 
understanding of history, of partisanship, of objective reality 
as social reality from the standpoint of the proletariat. of the 
dialectic process, of the necessity of the class struggle. They 
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both believe that culture must be actively employed in the combat 
to further socio-political change towards a classless society. 
Another point of similarity between these two authors. one which 
I particularly want to stress, is the element of didacticism. 
Lukacs' tone and criticism. as well as the prescriptive nature 
of his theory, are unmistakable in this regard. In the case of 
Brecht, however. this allegation may seem paradoxical in view of 
what has been discussed in terms of the latter's methods which 
leave so much space for the creative activity of other people. 
This space must not be mistaken for an openendedness. Brecht 
never loses his position of control as far as his final aim is 
concerned. He decides on the final result. All his plays since 
his Marxist conversion can be seen as functioning in the 
parabolic mode; each of them present a lesson which points into 
the direction of the Marxist, socialistic mission. Not only does 
his work assist the spectator towards a particular kind of 
l:.nowledge, but it also provides examples of how conflict 
situations may be dealt with. Even when Brecht sounds the 
workers out, he is still the one who is in final control. 
This quotation from "Popularity and Realism" will demonstrate 
this point. 
Popular means: intelligible to the broad masses. adopting 
and enriching their forms of expression I assuming their 
standpoint. confirming and correcting it I representing the 
most progressive section of the people so that it can assume 
leadership. and therefore intelligible to other sections of 
the people as well I relating to traditions and developing 
them I .... 
(Brecht 1977: 81) 
Everyone of these sentences show evidence of the aim to actively 
intervene by an author who has placed himself into a position of 
authority above the masses. Benevolently he will teach them to 
go into the direction which he believes will lead them to a 
better life. This condescending attitude could be defended with 
the argument that the masses are as yet underdeveloped as a 
result of the oppression they have experienced throughout the 
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ages, and must thus be helped at this stage. Nevertheless, it 
is an indication that Brecht, himself, whatever he claims, is 
still speaking in the context of class. 
The major point of difference between Lukacs and Brecht lies in 
their opinion as to how the Marxist aim is to be transmitted. 
Lukacs insists on his one closed form which strictly adhers to 
his theory, dismissing Expressionism and its methods as anti-
Marxist. Brecht, on the other hand, separates form from content, 
making use of every possible innovation, exploiting the methods 
of every other movement, especially those used by the 
Expressionists. Feeling in no way threatened as to the identity 
and wholeness of the reality he transmits, he accepts that this 
cannot be wholly and accurately presented by a closed work of art 
which tries to give the picture of reality. Rather, he makes it 
clear that every work of art is artificial by its very nature; 
that this artificiality can be employed openly and positively. 
The work can thus function in a 'comparative capacity, actively 
challenging the creative faculty of other people, hopefully 
steering them into a more accurate perception of the reality of 
their own conditions. It is on this level that Brecht's 
democracy comes in. The more he splits up his works into 
different dimensions and tensions, the more perspectives he 
creates, the greater the space for multiple contemplations and 
creations. Here we deal with Brecht the modernist who pushes 




Whether we talk about Lukacs and Brecht, or Habermas and Lyotard, 
we have to begin with the assumption that all four writers 
believe that there is something seriously wrong with society. 
The common enemy is the progressive development of capitalism; 
the common concern is what this development means in terms of the 
distribution of power and the ensuing effects of this. In a 
sense one can say that they are all involved in the struggle to 
improve society, or, at least, to prevent an even more negative 
state of affairs. Although marxist thought presumes that the 
dialectical movement itself moves to an ever-improved state of 
being, this optimistic attitude is o.nly partially apparent in the 
two debates in question. To a large extent one gets the 
impression that the efforts of these writers are directed against 
the onslaught of an increasingly powerful force . Brecht and 
Lukacs direct their efforts against fascism, which Brecht refers 
to as the manifestation of capitalism in its most extreme form. 
In their case the enemy is localised in a particular state and 
can be directly addressed. In the case of Lyotard and Habermas, 
however, the enemy is global and pervasive, not confined to any 
one particular state, but fully integrated into the structures 
of every day existence. The concern here is the status of 
knowledge in society and how it is employed to manipulate and 
legitimate power. Brecht and Lukacs focus their attention on the 
recognition and exposure of the truth under lying power structures 
in socio..:.political relations; showing that structures which have 
been seen to be immutable can, in fact, be changed or done away 
with altogether; realism, that is, a lack of it, is the 
accusation that hovers around the discussion. 
Habermas direct their attention to the matter of 
and how these involve, legitimise (Lyotard) 
(Habermas) power. Here the point of accusation is 





the threat of 
Where the four writers diverge from each other is how the 
underlying reality of capitalism and all its implications should 
be counteracted in the most effective way. As each of the 
writers put forward their convictions, they invoke specific 
aspects of the philosophical tradition (covertly at times, but 
at other times specifically by name) to ground and to clarify 
their line of thought. Lukacs' and Brecht's relationship to Marx 
and Hege 1 has been discussed in the first chapter. In this 
chapter I will focus on Lyotard and Habermas and their particular 
relationship to Kant and Hegel. 
Whether a philosopher, sociologist, artist, literary critic, in 
short, anyone who is involved in the life of present day cul tura 1 
activity is faced with questions of modernity and postmodernity. 
Is postmodernism simply a further development of modernism, or 
is it an anti-modernistic movement, actively negating the 
validity of the tradition of Enlightenment? Enlightenment and 
its bearing on present day thinking features in a central 
position in the discourses at hand. Postmodernism, whatever the 
opinions are as to its existence, has, as a concept, generated 
much critical writing in every sphere of our cultural life. It 
is not possible, within the framework of this discussion, to give 
a description of this phenomenon in any way that would do justice 
to it. Nevertheless, I shall give a couple of examples of the 
wide range of opinions put forward concerning it. Hopefully it 
will give an idea of the context in which the works of both 
Lyotard and Habermas are not only written, but of which they are 
constituents as well. 
The term, postmodernism, already poses a problem in its 
definition, as it is often put forward to challenge the 
possibility of a stable theory of meaning. The implication of 
open-endedness, that is, a resistance to any conclusive 
interpretation, is a constituent component of the concept as 
such. On the other hand it has variously been used to indicate 
non-conformative aesthetic attitudes (avant-gardism), a rejection 
of grand political theories (the critique of totalitarianism). 
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a critique of rationality and representation (Foucault and 
Derrida). Furthermore, it has been invoked in a conservative 
defence of postindustrial societies (Daniel Bell). An assessment 
of a work of art or literature in terms of whether it can be seen 
to be postmodernist or not, can neither be based conclusively on 
criteria in terms of features, nor in terms of the date of its 
first appearance. Features, conventions, and even the stories, 
of a variety of other, earlier movements are often made use of 
in a postmodern work in the form of a pastiche. As far as a 
histor ica 1 period is concerned, there is no clear transition from 
modernism to postmodernism, the two existing simultaneously over 
the last couple of decades. 
Jameson, however, does periodize postmodernism, linking its 
emergence to what he terms as the 'societe de consommation', also 
referred to the postindustrial society. In his "Reflections in 
Conclusions", he discusses what he sees to be the fate which has 
befallen modernism. Art, which used to be an oppositional anti-
social phenomenon, has become a component of commodity product ion 
and has thus found a social and economic niche within the system. 
Jameson judges this change of the position of art in relation to 
the society in which it exists to be the gap between 
postmodernism and what he sees as the earlier movement of 
modernism. Looking at some of the features associated with 
postmodernist works, he points out that abstraction, that is, the 
forever repositioning of the estrangement effect, part of the 
ideology of modernism, has spent itself as a tired convention to 
be replaced by hyperrealism or photorealism in the visual arts. 
and by the pastiche of older narratives in literature (Jameson 
1977: 209). In his Postmodernism or, The cultural Logic of Late 
Capitalism, he puts forward and discusses other features which 
he identifies with postmodernism: A fascination with surface 
replaces the former fascination with depth, manifesting itself 
in the culture of the image and the simulacrum. Furthermore. 
there is a definite decrease in affect, symptomatic of a new type 
of emotional groundtone. The self is perceived differently. 
dominated by a schizophrenic-like fear; a fear of fragmentation. 
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He opposes this to the modernist fear of alienation which works 
on the assumption that the subject is intact, attributing the 
postmodernist fear of fragmentation to a weakening of a sense of 
historicity (Jameson 1991: 6-15). 
On the other hand, Linda Hutcheon, in her preface to A Poetics 
of Postmodernism, identifies postmodernism as a "a problemizing 
force in our culture today". This force raises questions about 
the common-sensical and natural, but never offers answers that 
are anything other than provisional; they can only be 
contextually determined. Process, rather than conclusion, lies 
at the heart of postmodernism, indicated by the '-ize' in terms 
like problematize, totalize, contextualize, and others. She sees 
postmodernist art as being intensely self-reflexive and parodic 
while, nevertheless, attempting to root itself in the historical 
world. The emphasis is on the process as it negotiate~ these 
contradictions, rather than on any finished product resulting 
from a resolution of them. For instance, the concept 'to 
totalize', would not simply mean 'to unify', but would mean to 
unify with an eye to power and control, pointing to the hidden 
power relations behind our humanist and positivist systems of 
unifying disparate materials (Hutcheon 1988: x-xi). 
As the question of language games plays such a crucial part in 
the work of Lyotard and Habermas, I will now quote Ihab Hassan 
from his "Postface 1982: Toward a Concept of Postmodernism". 
Where the moderns sought purpose, the postmoderns celebrate 
play; hierachical principles of order yield to non-
predictability, as less emphasis is placed upon the finished 
work than on the process of creation. Instead of 
totalizing a sense of existence, the postmoderns deconstruct 
it, revealing how fraudulent any reductive summations must 
be, based as they are on principles we now recognize as mere 
assumptions. Metaphor is replaced by metonymy, in which the 
process of having a part stand for the whole lets each 
constituent element retain its own identity. An eagerness 
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for depth is replaced by a fascination with surface: texts 
are therefore "writerly" rather than "readerly", for there 
is no compulsion to find meaning beyond the author's 
performance on the page, which the reader is invited tore-
create .... 
(Hassan 1983: 4) 
What these three opinions have in common, amongst other things, 
is the preoccupation with fragmentation versus totality. 
Jameson, in line with marxist thinking, does not link this notion 
to reality as such. working on the assumption that there is the 
total global reality of capitalism. He ascribes the 
fragmentation of individual experience to the pervasive power of 
that reality. Hutcheon appears to presume that a view of a total 
reality is the result of a totalizing action, inevitably 
associated with power. Hassan links the totalizing of experience 
directly to the act of language, language being able to construct 
and deconstruct a sense of total existence. This is a far cry 
from Lukacs, who assumed the organic whole of reality, believing 
this had to be reflected in its totality, and even from Brecht, 
who also assumed the wholeness of reality, even though he was of 
the opinion that an understanding of it can be projected in an 
effective way by making use of fragments of experience, allowing 
for the modernist view that reality can be experienced 
differently by different people. 
In the introduction of his treatise, The Postmodern Condition: 
A Report on Knowledge (of which the essay under discussion in 
this dissertation is the appendix), Lyotard defines 'postmodern' 
as "incredulity towards metanarratives". He uses the word 
'modern' to designate any science that legitimates itself "by 
making an appeal to some grand narrative, such as the dialectics 
of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the 
rational or working subject, or the creation of wealth" (Lyotard 
1984: xxiii). Possibly alluding to Habermas, he sees the 
phenomenon of the rule of consensus between the sender and the 
addressee in which a statement of truth-value is accepted. 
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provided that it is cast in terms of a possible agreement between 
rational people, to be what he calls the Enlightenment Narrative. 
In this narrative the hero of knowledge works towards the good 
ethical and political end of universal peace. Narratives as such 
are in a state of crisis in the postmodern condition, as a result 
of transformations which have altered the game rules for science, 
literature and art. In Lyotard's view, the "narrative function 
is losing its functors", that is, the great hero, the great 
danger, the great voyage, the great goal. Instead, the function 
is being "dispersed in clouds of narrative language elements -
narrative. but also denotative, prescriptive. and so on". 
Thus the society of the future falls less within the 
province of a Newtonian anthropology (such as structuralism 
or systems theory) than a pragmatics of language particles. 
There are many different language games - a heterogeneity 
of elements. They only give rise to institutions in patches 
- local determinism. 
<Lyotard 1984: xxiv) 
Concerning the status of knowledge in society, Lyotard argues in 
his treatise, that the hold of the modernist episteme upon 
contemporary consciousness channels our cognitive and practical 
imagination in two directions. In the first place society is 
conceived as a functional whole, and knowledge is seen in terms 
of performabili ty. Know ledge is power. but power generates 
access to knowledge. In other words, power legitimates science 
and the law on the basis of their efficiency. It then 
legitimates this efficiency on the basis of science and the law. 
A circle of self-legitimation of power is set up. High 
performativity reduces the fragility intrinsic to the 
legitimation of power by minimizing risk and unpredictability. 
The other, alternative view of society into which the hold of the 
modernist episteme channels our consciousness, according to 
Lyotard, is to see society as divided into two, as an alienated, 
bifurcated totality, in need for reunification. Knowledge is 
seen here as 'critical' rather than 'functional'. Critical 
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knowledge is in the service of the subject. Its goal is not the 
legitimation of power, but rather empowerment; not the 
enhancement of the apparatus, but rather, that of the self-
formation of humanity. Lyotard sees this as a nineteenth century 
ideal, which he traces back to the work of Wilhelm von Humboldt. 
He places Habermas in that line of thought. 
In the current context of the experience of postindustrial 
societies Lyotard puts forward the possibility of alternative 
cognitive and social options to those which make an appeal to the 
grand narrative; options which are authentic to the experience 
at hand, and which had been obscured by the "modernist 
imperatives". He defines the new cognitive option variously as 
"paralogy" (Lyotard 1984: 60), "agonistics" (16), and 
"recognition of the heteromorphous nature of language games" 
( 66) . He describes the new social opt ion as a "tempo ray 
contract", supplanting permanent institutions in the 
professional, emotional, sexual, cultural, family and 
international domains, as well as political affairs(66). 
Looking specifically at the appendix of this treatise, namely, 
the essay, "Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism". the 
latter could be seen in itself as an embodiment of fragmentation. 
To begin with we are looking at a work which incorporates the 
discourse of a writer as he labels it with the title. the 
metadiscourse of a critic and, thirdly, the 'real' discourse of 
the writer, in which he puts forward what is really at stake for 
him. He completes what he overtly sets out to do in the title, 
that is he answers the question as to what postmodernism is. 
situating it as a part of modernism (in opposition to. for 
example, Jameson's view that there is a definite gap between the 
two) and giving his reasons for doing so. The form of the essay 
is one of an exegesis, which he divides into the three sections 
under the headings of "A Demand", "Realism", and "the 
Postmodern" . An exegesis, however, cannot stand as a pure 
discourse on its own as it invariably makes use of other people's 
discourses to clarify what it is saying. However, the work of 
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others is not inserted in a neutral way, always having first been 
subjected to some kind of critique. Thus we have a discourse 
which is at the same time a metadiscourse on a number of 
discourses. Lyotard's exegesis abounds with either allusions or 
direct references to other people' works and can, in a sense, be 
seen as a pastiche of discourses. Contrary to what one would 
expect of an exegesis, this one makes no attempt to hide a strong 
presence of affect. Nor can one say that the essay as a whole 
leaves space for open-endedness. Rather, Lyotard puts forward 
his concerns with a vehemence that can be compared to that of an 
Old Testament prophet as he predicts terrible consequences should 
his warnings not be heeded. 
The main target of Lyotard's criticism in this essay is the work 
of Habermas in the context of the latter's efforts towards a 
communication between the various discourses. Looking closer at 
the essay, however, it becomes clear that one is looking at a 
polemic against Habermas rather than at an investigative 
critique. Lyotard is quite clear on his own position and defends 
it emphatically, opposing, as it seems, everything that Habermas 
is propagating. This brings us to what can be seen as Lyotard's 
real discourse in this essay, that which, given the emphatic tone 
of his language, is what he really wants to state: the defence 
of the validity of the view that the unrepresentable exists. 
This is not only a reinforcement of his opinion regarding the 
heteromorphous nature of language game. He goes further by not 
allowing other opinions on this to exist with validity. In fact 
he strenuously opposes what he calls a 'slackening· in the sense 
of his perception of there being a general acceptance of an 
attitude of 'anything goes Instead, he insists specifically 
that the space must be left open for the attempt to present the 
existence of unrepresentability. 
Why would Lyotard be so emphatic about this? After all, why 
should others not be entitled to their opinion? The reason. 
according to him, rests on two counts. The first is what he sees 
as the political stake in all of this. seeing a direct link 
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between a totalizing way of representation, which claims to 
contain reality, and a totalitarian political state with its 
accompanying violence. Secondly, there is a sense of urgency as 
he perceives an across-the-board desire for the very tendency 
which, in his eyes, would lead to a disastrous result, that is, 
an urge to put an end to experimentation in the arts (Lyotard 
1984: 71). The emphatic tone, however, must also be seen as part 
of the rhetorical element in the essay. What emerges is that the 
element of the exegesis can be seen as secondary to that of 
exhortation, the former being used to support the latter rather 
than the other way around. Repeatedly employing terms such as 
'terror·, 'slackening· and 'mutterings·, Lyotard exhorts his 
readers to engage with him in a war against totality. 
Be that as it may, Lyotard stresses his point that the heritage 
of avant-gardism as found in modernism is the vital instrument 
in the presenting of the unrepresentable. He thus opposes what 
he sees to be the move to oust, suppress and liquidate this 
heritage. In particular he refers to the move in postmodern 
times which calls itself trans-avant-gardism~ a move which 
pretends to step beyond the fragmentary character of the 
experimentation of the avant-garde under the cover of 
eclecticism. Apparently free and liberated in the guise of 
"anything goes·, this eclecticism is in fact controlled by a 
power; for Lyotard the most overwhelming power of all in present 
times, namely, that of money. I would like to point out here 
what I see to be a difference between Lyotard's understanding of 
the functioning of avant-gardism and that of Jakobson, Brecht and 
even Jameson. The latter perceive the abstractions and 
deformations of modernist art works in the light of the 
estrangement effect, an attempt to enable a viewer to perceive 
reality in a new way, the artist having to go on inventing ever-
new forms in order to direct attention to it. This vision 
presupposes that there is one reality which is intact. a reality 
which can be represented, the estrangement effect being a method 
to achieve it. Lyotard, on the other hand, convinced that a 
reality can be conceived which cannot be represented, believes 
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the abstractions in avant-garde works to be a manifestation of 
the attempt to present the reality of unrepresentability. 
Furthermore, Lyotard puts forward a very different view on 
realism to that of Lukacs and Brecht. He sees it as a mode of 
representation propagated by a system of power which seeks to 
legitimise its existence. Whether power is in the hands of a 
particular party or in the hands of capital, the picture 
presented of reality by those in power is a constructed, easily 
accessible one which serves to divert the attention of the public 
from the uncomfortable, anxiety-provoking, depressing feelings 
of everyday life. What is more is that it is the picture which 
the public has been conditioned to desire; a picture which serves 
to reassure. The viewer can recognise it, decipher it, identify 
himself with its content and be reassured of his own identity. 
This in turn gives him a feeling of being accepted in society. 
The reassuring vision of reality would then be seen as evidence 
of a 'good' system and serve to keep that system in power. 
If one is now to go back and look at Lukacs· view on realism i.n 
this light one could gain new insights concerning the latter's 
convictions. Lukacs did work in the service of a totalitarian 
state, combating another form of totalitarianism. He did 
propagate a realism which reflected a whole picture of reality, 
which he also believed to be one whole. He allowed no 
alternative view, that is, whatever was produced outside his 
theory and system was not valid. The irony is that Lukacs· 
intention was surely not to produce a cover-up of what he saw to 
be true conditions. Rather, he wanted to expose the truth about 
the reality of capitalistic and fascistic power relations. In 
doing this he failed to address the truth about the system for 
which he worked. According to Lyotard's view on realism as a 
narrative which serves as a reassuring picture to divert the 
attention from the grim realities of every day existence, Lukacs· 
work may have served the opposite of his intentions, implying 
that he, himself, was a victim of his own state, inadvertantly 
propagating its power. 
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The modern artist, says Lyotard, is faced with a choice (Lyotard 
1984: 75). The first option would be to produce work which is 
in service of this cover-up; work which would fulfil certain 
apriori criteria as stipulated by the powers that be, and thus 
enjoy popularity and recognition. The second option would be to 
challenge the rules which were handed down to artists by their 
predecessors; rules and criteria which have become inadequate in 
the face of changing realities as a result of capitalism. The 
resulting work would be experimental and problematic in terms of 
accessibility. There would be an accompanying lack of popularity. 
As the rules governing the criteria of a 'good' work of art are 
made by whoever is in power, be it a political party or capital, 
the avant-garde work would not only be seen as not 'good', but 
also as a challenge to the system of power and its claim to being 
able to encompass all of life. A. political state would curb 
avant-gardism either by simply not recognising the works, or, in 
the extreme case, by suppressing them with force, whilst, if it 
is the market that is the power ruling the criteria. then these 
works would simply never be allowed to feature on the grounds of 
their not being purchasable commodities. 
If one is now to look at Brecht in this light one can say that 
the latter did take up the challenge to be oppositional, both in 
terms of challenging constricting conventions and in terms of 
challenging the existing order and constellation of power. He 
did have to flee for his life, as well as having to pay the price 
of being unable to freely perform his works. Where he differs 
radically in terms of Lyotard 's view is on the question of 
unrepresentability. Instead of making use of the estrangement 
technique to show the existence of the latter, he regrounded this 
technique in order to enable the spectator to see what he saw to 
be the truth about power relations from a different perspective. 
In contrast to Lyotard, Brecht believed that the very existence 
of the theatre depended on a vigorous communication between the 
artist and his audience. In other words, the case of Brecht 
shows that Lyotard's alternatives are too extreme. There does 
not have to be an either- or. Brecht can be seen as occupying 
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the space of a third alternative mediating the two. 
Lyotard uses the term modern in connection with art (not to be 
confused with how he makes use of it to designate a particular 
science in terms of modernistic aims) to cover both a modernist 
work of art as well as a postmodernist work (Lyotard 1984: 78). 
He situates the latter within modern art. which, according to 
him, is essentially oppositional; essentially tied to a 
shattering of belief. The modernist work presents the 
unrepresentable through the content, while still making use of 
a recognisable form and the solace that goes with this. The 
postmodernist work, however, attempts to convey 
unrepresentability via the form, making the form of 
representation itself unrepresentable. That means that the work 
is not created in accordance with any established rules. the 
rules themselves having to be discovered in the process of it 
becoming a work of art. The solace provided by a recognisable 
form is denied. He places the work of James Joyce in this 
category. 
What then is the unrepresentable in Lyotard's terms and why does 
he perceive the recognition of its existence as being of such 
vital importance? Lyotard invokes Kant's notion of the sublime 
for his cause. Furthermore, he opposes the latter's system to 
that of Hegel, which he rejects emphatically. Habermas also 
refers back to Kant but in another context. As the Enlightenment 
as such is a major concern in both Lyotard and Habermas' work, 
as well as in the modernist/postmodernist dispute on the whole, 
I shall now interrupt my discussion to take a closer look at 
Kant. 
Immanuel Kant (1724- 1804), according to Stoerig, started his 
philosophical life with the rationalistic system of Gottfried 
Leibnitz and Christian Wolff, which maintained that it is 
possible to develop a true image of the world by means of apriori 
principles of reason, without the necessity of experience. Later 
he came into contact with the theories of the English 
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Empiricists, John Locke and David Hume. Locke held that there 
is nothing in reason that did not first exist in the senses . 
Cognition is solely based on experience. According to this view 
metaphysics becomes impossible because experience cannot form the 
basis for anything supernatural or transcendental. Hume 
challenged philosophers and scientists to produce evidence that 
would allow us to make assertions about things we have not 
actually experienced, and questioned the assumption that we are 
justified in making generalizations based on a few cases (Stoerig 
1950: 265). 
Kant's reaction to this challenge was that it is impossible to 
find the kind of evidence demanded by Hume as long as the mind 
and its objects are thought of as two separate things. He held 
that the mind is actively involved in the objects that it 
experiences. In other words, the mind organizes experience into 
definite patterns. From that we can be sure that all things 
capable of being experienced are arranged in these patterns, even 
if we have not experienced them. In this way we can have 
knowledge of what we have not yet experienced. This, however. 
would mean that we must abandon the claim that we can know things 
as they are in themselves. Paul Guyer. in his "Introduction: The 
starry heavens and the moral law", emphasises that the certainty 
of the apriori origins of concepts of understanding and 
principles of judgement in the structure of human thought, as put 
forward by Kant, carries with it the cost of recognising that the 
representation of things, as they are given to us. does not 
conform to the things as they are in themselves, but rather, that 
these objects, as appearances, conform to our manner of 
representation. On the other hand, the very fact that the 
universal validity of the foundational principles of the 
scientific world-view can be proved only for the appearances of 
things, means that we can consider the possibility that things 
as they are in themselves may not be governed by these laws - but 
that they may be governed by other laws. This means that we can 
consider that at the deepest leve 1 we, ourselves. are free 
agents, bound only by the laws of morality, and not by the 
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deterministic laws of nature (Guyer 1992: 12). 
Kant wrote copiously throughout his life, constantly revising his 
views as he went along. His famous three Critiques were written 
in his later life. The Critique of Pure Reason has been seen by 
critics as offering a new foundation for human knowledge, 
virtually demolishing all of the traditional metaphysics. The 
c~r:itique of Practical Reason deals with man's moral existence. 
Guyer is of the opinion that it inextricably links human freedom 
to the moral law while attempting to reconstruct the most 
cherished ideas of traditional metaphysical belief on a practical 
rather than on a theoretical foundation. In the The Critique of 
Judgement Kant brings the topics of aesthetics and teleological 
judgement into his system. Critics see it as a completion as 
well as a revision of the work as put forward in the other two 
critiques. With these three critiques Kant makes a clear 
distinction between the faculties of cognition, morality and 
aesthetics, separating them from each other with no allowance of 
a possible bridge between them. It is the notion of this 
distinction which plays 
Lyotard/Habermas dispute. 
such an important role in the 
What was new about Kant's work is that 
he accommodates the disparate theories from both the Rationalist 
and the Empiricist systems in his one system. But what separates 
him from both these systems is the conviction that representation 
renders appearances of reality rather than reality itself. 
Things as they are in themselves are outside his system. The 
Rationalists as well as the Empiricists claim direct access to 
reality itself. Guyer sees him as the philosopher who 
transformed the Western conception of the human being from that 
of a mere spectator in the natural world, and that of a mere 
subject in the moral world, to that of an active agent in the 
creation of both (Guyer 1992: 11-12). 
The notion of the beautiful and the sublime is discussed in The 
Critique of Judgement. Working along the same lines as he did 
in the two preceding Critiques, he examines the possibility of 
a judgement of what happens in nature in terms of purposiveness. 
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and what role aprioric reason plays in such a judgement. He sees 
the faculty of judgement in terms of two components, the first 
one being the capacity to experience sensual feelings of pleasure 
and pain, which he calls the lower, and the second, the faculty 
for reflective judgement, which he calls the higher. The 
aprioric principle of purposiveness is at work in that kind of 
judgement. It is the faculty of judgement which enables us to 
orientate ourselves in the world as a whole. Theoretical reason 
teaches us only strict legality of happening, while practical 
reason enables us to behave in such a way as though all happening 
is directed towards a higher moral purpose. Judgement closes the 
gap between the worlds of nature and freedom, giving us the 
concept of man as a whole, reasonable being. This, Kant 
suggests, is an inherent need within us in any case (Stoer ig 
1950: 292) . 
Turning to the beautiful and the sublime, Kant refers us to the 
judgement of taste. This is an aesthetical judgement because 
instead of the representation referring to the object in 
question, it refers to the subject and its feeling of pleasure 
and pain. The imagination, as opposed to cognition, is at play. 
The judgement of taste is aesthetical, not logical. The 
determining ground is subjective feeling; feeling of pleasure and 
pain. What is crucial about the satisfaction which determines 
the judgement of taste is that it is disinterested. It is of no 
interest to us, when judging something as to its beauty, whether 
anything depends on the existence of this thing. Rather. we 
judge it by mere observation, by intuition and reflection. All 
we want to know is whether the representation of the object is 
accompanied by a feeling of satisfaction in us. the subjects. 
It does not end here, however. Kant identifies the beautiful as 
"that which apart from concepts is represented as the object of 
a universal satisfaction" (Kant 1892: 46). He concludes that 
because it is the object of disinterested satisfaction, there is 
the implication of there being ground for satisfaction in all 
men. As the subject feels free in terms of the satisfaction. 
55 
unable to find any ground for it in his private conditions, it 
can be presumed that it must be grounded in something that he can 
presuppose in every other person as well. Thus he can attribute 
a similar satifaction to everyone. This would mean that he would 
speak of the beautiful as though beauty is a characteristic of 
the obJect and the judgement is a logical one, when in fact it 
is only aesthetical, involving merely a reference of the 
representation of the object to the subject. The presupposition 
of it being valid for all men is similar to that of a logical 
subject. However, this universality cannot arise out of 
concepts, from which there is no transition to the feeling of 
pleasure and pain. This means that judgement of taste, combined 
with the awareness of separation from interest, must claim 
validity for every man without this universality depending on the 
object. Kant calls this a 'subjective universality'. 
Kant sees the sublime as another variety of aesthetic judgement. 
The feelings which determine it would also be disinterested. It 
can also be presumed to be grounded in something that can be 
presupposed in every other person. It can claim a subjective 
universality. Over and above this Kant sees the sublime as that 
which is absolutely great, that is, it is beyond comparison. It 
~s beyond comprehension, and (most important in terms of Lyotard) 
it is without form. Comparing the sublime with the beautiful, 
Kant sees the satisfaction experienced in connection with the 
latter as being one in terms of quality (whether something has 
a purposiveness in terms of the ultimate perfection found in 
nature), whereas the experience in the face of the sublime is one 
in terms of quantity. Without form, it arises out of an 
experience so immense that the imagination cannot provide a 
representation of it. This causes pain and fear, because of the 
realization that something that is beyond comprehension is also 
beyond control. At the same time we are reminded that there is 
a human faculty, reason, which deals with the super-sensory, 
which sets the imagination into play. The acknowledgement of 
this faculty affords pleasure. Although the sublime conflicts 
with the interests of sensibility, thus giving rise to 
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unpleasantness, it, nevertheless, at the same time stirs up in 
man the consciousness that by virtue of his reason he is raised 
above the finite world of sense. 
Lyotard aligns the separate language games to Kant's three 
faculties (although, in his view, there are an infinite number 
of language games), the discourses, which according to him, 
Habermas wants to connect to each other. Another point of 
interest to him is Kant's notion of the Ding an sich which 
recognises the limit of human representation, allowing for the 
inaccessibility of a reality about the things depicted; a reality 
beyond depiction. And then, of course, Lyotard aligns Kant's 
notion of the sublime to his vision of the existence of the 
unrepresentable, in so far as the sublime (like the Ding an sich) 
exists outs ide Kant's system and represents something, the 
existence of which is conceivable but beyond comprehension, and 
beyond representation. Thus, whatever his opinion may be about 
what he calls the Enlightenment narrative as such, Lyotard holds 
on to the system of Kant in as far as he sees in it an opening 
which allows for the possibility of the existence of something 
outside it. He rejects Hegel's system, which he sees as being 
absolutely closed, referring to it as a transcendental illusion. 
Hegel's system does not recognise the possibility of there being 
anything beyond its comprehension. One can look at the latter's 
direct predecessor, Fichte, who was of the opinion that human 
consciousness can cover the whole content of the universe. 
The notion of dialectic, which has been described in Chapter 1, 
contains opposites within it. Although movement and sublation 
suggests freedom from a potential deadlock, the movement in this 
system can be seen to move in an ascending spiral pattern, 
contained within the constraints of opposites as well as by the 
f ina 1 goal towards which it moves. Emilia Steuerman, in her 
essay "Habermas vs Lyotard" points out that Hegel was not 
prepared to accept, uncritically, Kant's synthetic unit of 
heterogeneous domains of reason. To him. the activity of 
critique itself must be accounted for; critique must become 
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self-conscious. Because of modernity's awareness of time, 
problems of normativity (to create norms which would ground the 
differentiated domains of rationality) would become an historical 
endeavour. Hegel's solution to the normative problem is carried 
out in terms of a philosophy of the subject. Because he believed 
that the transcendental dimension of reason has got to be itself 
accounted for in terms of empiricity, of its historicity, he 
moved on to the idea of a universal subject in history, namely, 
Absolute Reason. However, this unity, says Steuerman, this 
Absolute Reason assumed a form which was so overwhelming that in 
the end it denied the very problem it tried to solve: the subject 
as universal denied the subject as individual, and thus th.e 
problem of critique and normativity disappeared. Should this 
particular path be followed, Steuerman suggests, then modernity 
does become a symbol of totalitarianism, with political 
consequences in which a totalizing absolute reason would be 
embodied in a universal subject, be it the state or the 
proletariat (Steuerman 1992: 102). 
Although Lyotard does not actually call Habermas a follower of 
Hegel's system, he does link him to the underlying thought. The 
drive towards uniting the different discourses by filling up the 
gap between them would, in his view, be an attempt to subordinate 
them into one quasi-organic whole; into an all-containing master 
narrative. Lyotard sees this as a retrogressive step, one which 
clings to the concepts of a subject and a unitary end of history; 
concepts which have become increasingly suspect, being the basis 
of the fantasy which is the task of realistic representation to 
uphold. Lyotard believes that the project of Enlightenment, with 
the aim of freeing man from the bondage of unenlightenment, is 
a nostalgic and dangerous illusion. 
Having concentrated on Lyotard's point of view, let me now turn 
to Habermas. The latter places himself squarely into the 
Enlightenment tradition of Kant, Hegel and Marx. In his 
"Modernity versus Postmodernity", which has also been published 
under the title, "Modernity- an incomplete Project". he sees 
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postmodernism in the light of anti-modernism and rejects the 
perception that the goals of Enlightenment necessarily lead to 
totalitarianism with 
(Habermas 1990: 351). 
its accompanying terrorist activity 
In other words, he does not invalidate the 
initial Enlightenment goal in terms of the promise of happiness 
and improvement as a result of greater knowledge, even though he 
sees this as not having materialized. Like Lyotard, he feels 
that present day life experience is affected negatively by the 
forces of the powers that be, contingent on the one-sided 
emphasis on instrumental knowledge in society. What Lyotard 
calls the realities of experience in a postindustrial society, 
Habermas refers to as societal modernizations brought about by 
the imperatives of the capitalist modernizations of the economy. 
What then is the project of Enlightenment? Seyla Benhabib (the 
translator of Habermas· article), who examines Ly6tard"s 
Postmodern Condition in terms of whether or not postmodernism and 
feminism can become allies in terms of epistemic options and 
normative visions, puts forward a brief introduction concerning 
Enlightenment thought and the subsequent criticism of it. Before 
concentrating on the account put forward by Habermas, I shall 
borrow some of this outline in order to give some general 
background to what Habermas is saying. 
"Modern Philosophy", Benhabib quotes Lyotard, "began with the 
loss of the world" . The autonomous bourgo is subject made the 
decision to take nothing and no authority for granted of which 
the content and strictures had not been subjected to thorough 
examination. This decision began with the withdrawal from the 
world. The question of classical epistemology from Descartes to 
Hume, from Locke to Kant was how to make congruous the order of 
representations in consciousness with the order of 
representations outside the self. Caught in the prisonhouse of 
its own consciousness, the modern epistemological subject tried 
to recover the "world it had well lost" (Benhabib borrows this 
phrase from R. Rorty's article, "The world well lost"). T!.io 
options were available in order to achieve this. The first one 
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was to reassure oneself that the world would be gained by the 
direct and immediate evidence of the senses, as in empiricism. 
The second option, the rationalistic one, was to insist that the 
rationality of the creator, or the harmony of the mind and 
nature, would guarantee the correspondence between the two orders 
of representation. Whether empiricist or rationalist, modern 
epistemologists agreed that the task of knowledge was to build 
an adequate representation of things. Modern epistemology 
operated with a threefold distinction: the order of 
representation in our consciousness (ideas and sensations); the 
signs which transmitted this order to other people (the words); 
and that to which the words referred (the objective world). The 
meaning of a word was seen to be that which it designates. The 
primary function of language was denotative, that is, it has to 
inform us about the state of affairs as it exists objectively. 
Thus, the classical episteme of representation presupposed a 
spectator perception of the knowing self, a designative theory 
of meaning, and a denotative theory of language CBenhabib 1992: 
206) . 
The critique of this classical episteme, leading to its eventual 
reject~on, began in the nineteenth century. Three directions 
developed, each focusing on a different aspect. The critique of 
the spectator conception of the subject began with German 
Idealism. This continued with Marx and Freud, to Horkheimer, and 
to Habermas in his .Knowledge and Human Interests. In this 
critique the spectator model of the self is replaced by an 
active, producing, fabricating humanity which creates the 
conditions of objectivity by forming nature through its own 
historical activity. The second direction of criticism was 
directed at the modern concept of the object. This tradition is 
associated with Nietzsche, Heidegger and Adorno, and also 
Horkheimer. Here, the modern episteme is viewed as an episteme 
of domination. Adorno, together with Horkheimer, argues that it 
is 'the concept', the very unit of thought in the western 
tradition that imposes homogeneity and identity upon the 
heterogeneity of material. This view sees the drive for identity 
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of conceptual thought culminating in the technical triumph in the 
West, which can only know things in that it comes to dominate 
them. The third tradition of the criticism of the classical 
episteme, is a critique of the modern concept of the sign. This 
critique was initiated by Saussure and Peirce, to be taken up by 
Frege and Wittgenstein. They argue that it is impossible to make 
sense of meaning, reference and language in general as long as 
linguistic signs are seen as 'private marks'. The public and 
shared character of language is an essential prerequisite. There 
is no natural relation between a sound, the word it represents 
in a language and the content it refers to. For Peirce, the 
relation of the sign (of which words are but one species) to the 
signified is mediated by an interpretant. For Saussure, it is 
within a system of differential relations that certain sounds get 
arbitrarily frozen to stand for words. In this analysis of 
language there is a move from the private to the public, from 
consciousness to sign, from the individual word to a system of 
relations among linguistic signs. According to Benhabib, this 
is the tradition which has triumphed in postmodernity. Whether 
in analytic philosophy, or in contemporary hermeneutics, or in 
French poststructuralism, the paradigm of language has replaced 
the paradigm of consciousness (Benhabib 1992: 208). 
Habermas, in putting forward his interpretation of the Project 
of Enlightenment, stresses that although the emphasis is placed 
on the aesthetic domain when matters of modernity are discussed, 
it is a mistake to ignore the other two faculties (in Kantian 
terms) as being equally important spheres of culture as a whole. 
He first clears the way by defining the shifting implications of 
the meaning of the word 'modern' throughout the ages. linking it 
always to a changed consciousness of time. Up to the 
Enlightenment period, the term appeared and reappeared in Europe 
during those periods when the consciousness of a new epoch came 
into being through a renewed relationship to the ancient 
classics. Then, the ideals of the French Enlightenment freed 
themselves from the spell of the ancient classics on the basis 
of a belief in the infinite progress of knowledge and science; 
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convinced that this progress would lead towards an ever-advancing 
social and moral improvement. Referring to Kant's faculties, 
Habermas borrows Max Weber's characterization of cultural 
modernity as "the separation of the substantive reason expressed 
in religion and metaphysics into three autonomous spheres", that 
is: science, morality and art (Habermas 1990: 348). That would 
mean that cultural modernity, according to Habermas, came into 
being with the separation of the faculties. Divided into these 
three, each domain could become institutionalized. The problems 
of the old world-view could now be handled separately in each 
sphere by professional experts. Ideally, greater knowledge could 
be reached in each field which would, in turn, benefit the larger 
public in terms of improving everyday praxis. Habermas points 
to what he sees as the excessive optimism of some Enlightenment 
thinkers who had the expectation that the arts and sciences 
would, in fact, not only promote the control of the natural 
forces, but would also further the understanding of the world, 
the self, moral progress, the justice of institutions, and even 
happiness; it would promote a rational organization of everyday 
social life. 
These expectations were not fulfilled, however; breaking down 
completely in the twentieth century. What happened instead was 
that the more the experts developed in their autonomous spheres, 
the greater bec~me the gap between them and the general life-
world (Lebenswelt). On the whole, the achievements in the 
domains of knowledge in terms of specialized treatment and 
reflect ion did not "become the property of everyday praxis" , and 
certainly not immediately (Habermas 1990: 348). Not only did the 
life-world not improve, but it was even in a poorer state than 
before, its traditional substance having been devalued. The 
autonomy of each segment of culture resulted in a gap between 
them and the hermeneutics of everyday communication. Thus the 
notion of the failure of the Enlightenment project as such. 
Habermas poses the question whether there is something wrong with 
the ideals in themselves, necessitating a rejection of them. or 
whether something went wrong in the procedure of realizing them. 
62 
He is of the latter opinion and puts forward his particular 
alternative of communicative reason. 
Habermas diagnoses the crises in present day social life which 
evoke a number of negating responses to be the result of what he 
calls the disturbed communicative infrastructure of everyday 
life, brought about by the subordination of the life-worlds to 
capitalistic imperatives of economics, and to matters of power 
justification. Like Lyotard, he sees knowledge as the powerful 
weapon in what must inevitably be a political stake. Unlike 
Lyotard, however, he believes that the separation between 
cognitive knowledge (in service of the powers that be for its 
performability), moral knowledge and aesthetic knowledge, brought 
about by the ever-increasing autonomy of each sphere, is at the 
root of this lopsided concentration of power. Furthermore, he 
is convinced that there is a deep human need to communicate 
meaningfully and socially. He interprets the call for a negating 
of modernistic culture as a response to this frustrated need. 
Looking at what he judges to be the false programs of the 
negation of culture, Habermas first sets out to identify which 
of these efforts mistake the activity of the aesthetic cultural 
domain as the cause of the problem, using this as a scapegoat 
rather than analysing the real causes of societal modernization. 
He places Daniel Bell in this category. The latter sees 
modernist culture as being incompatible with the moral basis for 
a purposive, rational way of life, convinced that the principle 
of self-realization and the call for authentic self-experience 
encourage a hedonism which is inimical to the discipline of 
professional life. He calls for a revival of religious faith 
which is tied to a faith in tradition. As it is impossible to 
simply call up this faith, says Habermas. this direction of 
thought has led to an intellectual and political confrontation 
with the carriers of cultural modernity. 
But. says Habermas, there are problems inherent in cultural 
modernism itself which justifiably evoke a number of responses. 
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one of which is the call for postmodernism. The crucial problem, 
in his view, is the increasingly widening gap between the avant-
garde and the life-world of the general public. The spirit and 
the discipline of the avant-garde movement emerged in the 
nineteenth century with the work of Baudelaire who was influenced 
by the theories of E.A.Poe. This is the point in history which 
Habermas associates with a radicalized consciousness of 
modernity, that is, an understanding of the 'modern' as having 
freed itself from all historical ties. His view of the spirit 
of the avant-garde is as follows. (I am giving a very close 
reading of Habermas' own text here in an attempt to gain absolute 
clarity on how his view on the avant-garde compares with that of 
Lyotard, and with that of both Lukacs and Brecht on 
Expressionism.) 
The spirit of the avant-garde, says Habermas, is characterized 
by attitudes that have developed around the focus of a changed 
consciousness of time. The metaphor which expresses this is that 
of a vanguard which penetrates into unknown terri tory on a 
scouting mission, exposing itself to risks of sudden, shocking 
encounters. The territory which the avant-garde conquers is the 
as yet unoccupied future. There is the necessity of orientation 
on ground which has never been surveyed. However, says Habermas, 
this orientation into the future, this anticipation of an 
undetermined, contingent future, this cult of the new, are, in 
actual fact, the glorification of the present; a present which 
constantly gives birth to new, subjectively established pasts. 
This new consciousness of time does not only express the 
experience of a mobilized society, accelerated history and the 
fragmentation of everyday life. Underlying the celebration of 
the transitory, the ephemeral and the dynamic there is a longing 
for an undefiled. stable present. Habermas quotes Octavio Paz 
as the latter describes modernism as a self-negating movement. 
its secret theme being the longing for a true present (Habermas 
1990 (2): 35). 
With this interpretation Habermas explains what he perceives to 
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be an abstract opposition to history in the avant-garde: history 
loses the structure of an organically structured event, handed 
down by tradition which is committed to continuity. Instead, 
single epochs lose their face, sacrificed to the affinity of the 
present to that which is most distant, and that which is close, 
that is, the decadent recognises itself, unmediated, in the 
barbaric, the wild and the primitive. The anarchistic intention 
of exploding the continuity of history explains the subversive 
power of this aesthetic consciousness which rebels against the 
normalizing function of tradition. This aesthetic consciousness 
lives off the experience of the rebellion against all that is 
normative, neutralizing all that is morally good and practically 
useful. Habermas does not, however, see this movement as being 
simply anti-historical. Rather, he sees it as making use of the 
past as made available by the objectifying scholarship of 
historicism, while opposing the neutralizing effect on the 
criteria of history brought about by that historicism (Habermas 
1990 (2): .34). 
Turning to the art works of the avant-garde, Habermas notes that 
as these movements unfolded, culminating in surrealism in the 
twentieth century, matters of form, like colour, lines, sounds 
and movements no longer served the cause of the 'adequate 
representation of the objective world'. Rather they became 
aesthetic objects in themselves. The movement removed itself 
completely from matters of social concern, to practise 'art for 
art's sake'. So much did modern art move away from fulfilling 
its initial promise, in Enlightenment terms, of enhancing the 
happiness of the 'whole of life', that questions about its very 
right to exist began to be asked. Art had become a critical, 
antagonistic mirror showing the irreconcilable nature of the 
worlds of aesthetic and social concerns. 
The surrealist revo 1 t, says Habermas, was a desperate bid to 
remove the gap between art and everyday life. An attempt was 
made to "blow up the autarkical sphere of art and to force a 
reconciliation of art and life'' (Habermas 1990 (1): 350). 
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The reason why this attempt failed to achieve its goal, according 
to Habermas, was because it only allowed access to one of the 
three autonomous spheres of culture. In everyday communication, 
cognitive meanings, moral expectations and subjective expressions 
must relate to one another. Not only would the opening up of one 
of these spheres fail to overcome a reified everyday praxis, but 
it could have more serious consequences as well. If one of the 
spheres were to become over-extended into other domains, as for 
example, if there were to be an aestheticizing of politics, or 
a replacement of politics by moral rigorism, or the submission 
to the dogmatism of a doctrine, then this could have 
'terroristic' (in Lyotard's sense) consequences. On the other 
hand, Habermas suggests, it would be out of proportion and out 
of relation to use this as a reason to identify the project of 
modernity as such with the state of consciousness of an 
individual terrorist; it would not be a reason to see the 
intentions of the Enlightenment tradition as leading to 
totalitarianism with its accompanying terrorist activities. 
Habermas notes that the spirit of aesthetic modern culture, as 
he has described it, has aged in present day times, beginning in 
the 1960s and 1970s. This should not necessarily be a reason to 
negate modernity as such. however. The other two autonomous 
spheres, those of science and morality, he admits. were also 
subjected to parallel attempts of negation, even though, in 
contrast to aesthetic modernism, they did maintain the connection 
to the forms of praxis in their field. But, he argues. that 
connection was very specialized and is still far removed from the 
praxis of every day life. 
Habermas is of the opinion that, instead of giving up the project 
of modernity, we should rather learn both from the errors which 
have accompanied it as well as from the mistakes of the attempts 
to negate it. He suggests that this can be achieved if 
approached from the viewpoint of everyday praxis by looking at 
the reception of art. If, in dealing with problems, this is done 
from only the one dimension of the aesthetic, separating it from 
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the aspects of truth and justice, then this clear line of 
separation would immediately dissolve when the non-expert 
attempts to draw the aesthetic experience into his everyday life. 
On the other hand, an aesthetic experience, which is not 
primarily seen in terms of the expert's critical judgement of 
taste, could have a changed status. Should it be seen in terms 
of clarifying a situation in a life history, it becomes a 
different discourse, a language game which is no longer that of 
aesthetic criticism. Not only would this experience then shed 
new light onto our needs, but it would also affect our normative 
expectations and our cognitive interpretations. In that way, 
says Habermas, an expert's culture could be reappropriated into 
the life-world. The other two spheres could be reappropriated 
in a similar manner. Only if the life-world has has become 
enriched with this reappropriation, can it manage to develop 
institutions out of itself which are able to effectively oppose 
the internal dynamics and the imperatives of the almost 
autonomous economic system (Habermas 1990 (1): 353). 
From this description of Habermas' discussion on the project of 
modernity, which can in itself be interpreted as a critique of 
cultural modernism, I think it would be wrong to place him at the 
opposite pole of postmodernism as represented by Lyotard. Rather 
he should be seen as occupying a third. alternative pole. On the 
one hand he is critical of modernity as it has manifested itself 
in real terms. On the other hand he does not want to discard its 
ideals or the heritage of the philosophical tradition on which 
it has based itself. I believe that the title of his essay, 
which puts forward 
partially misleading. 
modernity as an incomplete project is 
It is true that he feels there is as yet 
much to be done; that with a new approach the project can move 
forward rather than being discarded and replaced. But that does 
not do justice to that aspect of the essay which is critical of 
cultural modernism, especially in terms of the avant-garde. What 
he is really saying is that the project has not achieved what it 
set out to do because it has gone wrong. This, however can be 
remedied. The essay does not suggest that Habermas wants to 
67 
discard the distinction between the different faculties as 
instituted by Kant. After all, he does agree with Max Weber's 
view that cultural modernity began with the separation of the 
faculties. Nor is he against specialized expertise as such, as 
can be seen from the way he realizes that artistic production 
would cease if it were not carried out in the form of specialized 
treatment of autonomous problems CHabermas 1990 (1): 351). What 
he protests against is the total separation between the 
faculties, which has led to a subsequent separation between the 
activities of the experts of culture and the people whose life-
world should be benefitting, in Enlightenment terms, from this 
activity. What is missing, and has been missing all along, is 
a meaningful communication between the discourses. 
The kind of communication Habermas has in mind is based on 
consensus. He believes that the paradigm of knowledge must be 
replaced by the paradigm of "mutual understanding between 
subjects capable of speech and action" CHabermas 1987: 295). In 
his essay, "An Alternative Way out of the Philosophy of the 
Subject: Communicative versus Subject-Centered Reason", he 
suggests that at each stage in the progress ion of modernity, 
philosophers were faced with cross-roads, that is, they had to 
choose one direction at the expense of others. Different 
directions might have been chosen should the decision have been 
negotiated by consensual communication. So, for example, he 
points to Hegel and Marx who " ... swallow[ed] the intuition 
concernin~ the ethical totality back into the horizon of the 
self-reference of the knowing and acting subject". Instead they 
could have explicated that intuition "in accord with the model 
of unconstrained consensus formation in a communication community 
standing under cooperative constraints" before choosing which 
way to go (Habermas 1987: 295). In the same essay Habermas 
explicates what he means by the paradigm of mutual understanding, 
in which the performative attitude is crucial. The participants 
of a discussion enter into an interpersonal relationship as they 
come to an understanding about something in the world and 
coordinate their plan of action. He compares this relationship 
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to the system of personal pronouns in grammar, in which pronouns 
are transformed from first, second or third persons depending on 
who speaks. In other words, the relationship is structured by 
a system of "reciprocally interlocked perspectives among the 
speakers" (Habermas 1987:297). 
Habermas does not stand alone in his desire to bridge cleavages 
by way of language. Humboldt, to whose line of thought Benhabib 
aligns Habermas, was a follower of Johann Georg Hamann, a 
contemporary of Kant's. Known as the spokesman for those who 
were beginning to oppose the rationalism of Enlightenment, Hamann 
rejected the division Kant made between sensuousness and 
understanding. He believed that language, within which 
understanding is given a sensuous existence, can bridge this gap. 
He saw language as the key to everything, the link between 
idealism and realism. He believed that the whole of philosophy 
consists more of language than of reason, and that the problems 
posed by history can be solved by it (Stoerig 1950: 307). Much 
further back one can see evidence of the consternation of people 
not being able to communicate in terms of language in the Old 
Testament story of the Tower of Babe 1 (Genes is 11). and its 
resolution in the New Testament story of Pentecost, in which all 
people were reunited in the common language of the Holy Spirit 
(Acts 2) . 
It is my opinion that the views put forward by Habermas and 
Lyotard show evidence of a common concern and a common goal. even 
though there is disagreement on how these should be dealt with. 
Both authors react to what they see as a reified existence in the 
society of late capitalism. Both are of the opinion that 
knowledge is the crucial weapon which ensures the status quo in 
terms of power relations. In our current society, according to 
both writers, access to know ledge is held by those in power. 
There is a privileging of one-sided, instrumental knowledge, 
which is then, in turn, employed in the service of the self-
perpetuating legitimation of power. Thus society moves 
inevitably into the direction of totalitarianism. This, both 
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writers suggest, has been made possible by the direction which 
Enlightenment has taken, either by being a faulty project in the 
first place, or by taking mistaken directions during the course 
of time. Lyotard is of the opinion that the experience of 
fragmentation is an authentic indication of a fragmented society 
which communicates in an infinite number of discourses. 
According to him, it was never an organic whole, the project of 
Enlightenment having forced the illusion of a wholeness 
artificially onto its essentially heterogenous character in the 
form of a master narrative. This master narrative is used to 
mislead society into a comforting but untrue picture of itself. 
Society is thus prevented from recognising the true state of 
power relations, disempowering it to defend itself against an 
increasing state of totalitarianism. Efforts must be made to 
destroy this illusion. The aesthetic discourse in the form of 
the heritage of the avant-garde movement has helped to do this, 
not only by shattering the belief in terms of an organic 
continuity, but by showing that something can exist outside the 
knowledge of a system. 
Habermas, on the other hand, also does not see society as a whole 
in the state in which it is, but he presupposes that that is what 
it is essentially, or what it should be, and that an effort must 
be made to bring this about. According to him, fragmentation is 
the root of the problem, but something can be done to bridge the 
cleavages. When society is in a fragmented state, then it is 
possible for decisions to be made by a power which is 
concentrated in relatively few hands, the work of the experts 
being used in service of this. In a unified society, however. 
there could be a democratic decision making process in which 
there is clear communication not only between the discourses. but 
also between people, between experts and non-experts, enabling 
the participants to contribute equally by consensus. There could 
be transparency. Knowledge would be gained by way of 
intersubjectivity. 
To Lyotard the idea of a system based on an all-inclusive 
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consensus is a claustrophobic nightmare. What happens to those 
who do not fit into it? Will they be marginalized or simply 
eliminated? Is there a provision for a right of a private 
existence outs ide consensus . Discourses that are all 
interconnected, transparent, and in the service of each other, 
lay themselves open to becoming inhabited by some power which 
will then use this whole interconnected system to legitimate 
itself. As long as the faculties are still separated they can 
stand in a critical position towards each other, acting as a 
control to a spiralling ascent to power; a potential contained 
in every discourse. 
I think it is siginificant that both Lyotard and Habermas in 
their effort to put forward their views as to what they consider 
to be acceptible positions in the face of the realities of 
present day options, no longer talk about the class struggle. 
Coming from a Marxist background they both seem to have moved 
away from the doctrine in its narrow sense . Capital ism does 
remain the force which must be opposed. However, there no longer 
seems to be the notion that society will inevitably move towards 
an ideal state of socialism with a resulting happiness. Lyotard 
does not look positively into the future at all, fighting to stop 
what he sees to be a deterioration of conditions. Unlike Lukacs 
and Brecht, he not only opposes fascist totalitarianism, but all 
totalitarianism as such. Habermas, on the other hand, is more 
optimistic and looks to find a creative alternative option to 
loosen the stranglehold of the either- or choice, in an attempt 
to move into the future positively and actively. Although both 
these writers oppose capitalism, they criticise a mechanism 
rather than a particular class. All people are the victims of 
this mechanism in terms of an impoverishment of the fabric of 
every day life which they see to be dominated by an almost 
perfect, invincible system of reification. 
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CONCLUSION 
The result of my investigation of the Expressionist debate in the 
light of the modernist/postmodernist controversy. in which I have 
covered a vast amount of material, has been that a number of 
issues have been raised in terms of aesthetic and social theory, 
each of which could legitimately be highlighted and developed 
further. What has emerged is that in the case of these two 
debates, aesthetic theory cannot be divorced from social theory. 
This can be ascribed to the common Marxist background of these 
writers, which has determined their common concern in terms of 
a responsibility towards society; a responsibility which demands 
active intervention in the socio-political domain. The concern 
with responsibility in terms of promoting the happiness of 
mankind has. in these. discuss ions. been traced back to 
Enlightenment goals. However, the specific link with the Marxist 
doctrine has narrowed this general aim down to focus directly on 
political concerns. This is openly displayed in the debate 
between Lukacs and Brecht in which both the tone and the imagery 
are militant. the enemy, clearly identified in terms of the class 
struggle. being the oppressing class in capitalist and fascist 
societies. Lukacs and Brecht both show clear commitment to 
t1arx's philosophy with its Hegelian background in terms of 
dialectics. By the time that the later dispute began to be 
fought out, the tradition which critiques the Enlightenment 
concept of the sign (as formulated by Benhabib), initiated by 
Saussure and Peirce at the beginning of this century, had come 
fully to the fore (Benhabib 1992: 208); the main focus of concern 
now being directed at language. The political implications of 
social and aesthetic theories are still at stake. However, the 
enemy, here identified as the global development of capitalism, 
can no longer be seen in the relatively simple, clearly 
identifiable form of an oppressor section of a particular 
society. The class struggle as such is not raised by either 
Lyotard or Habermas. Bather, they react against what they see 
to be a progressive reification of every day life, resulting in 
a fragmented, alienated existence which is the result of global 
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capitalism. No specific concrete enemy against which the attack 
can be levelled can be identified. As this focal point is 
missing, the struggle goes beyond actual groups of people to 
consider the role that knowledge in terms of the Enlightenment 
tradition has played in lending itself to the unequal power 
relations which have marked this century. Either the 
Enlightenment tradition, which includes the philosophy Marx, must 
be totally discarded, or it must be reconsidered and changed. 
Language is seen as the crucial medium. As the picture of a 
unified whole reality, still assumed as such by Lukacs and 
Brecht, has been exploded. the matter of fragmentation versus 
totality is of crucial concern in the later debate. 
Interestingly. a 
earlier debate. 
similar concern also played a role in the 
However, when Lukacs criticises the 
Expressionists for their use of montage in their art works, 
seeing it as a fragmented, faulty representation of reality. 
neither he nor Brecht doubted that a whole reality as such did 
exist. 
To end this dissertation, I will now highlight what I consider 
to be perhaps the most important issue to have emerged as a 
result of the juxtaposition of these two debates; an issue 
contained in my title. I have looked at the Expressionist Debate 
in the light of postmodern concerns in order to gain greater 
insight in terms of what the real stakes. apart from promoting 
Marxism, are in that debate. The resulting investigation has not 
only helped towards this but has also served to put the stakes 
and dynamics of the later debate into a clearer perspective. 
Expressionism is the ostensible point of dispute in the 
Lukacs/Brecht debate. However. neither writer actually is 
particularly interested in the movement itself or its 
development. It was not so much Lukacs' denunciation of it than 
his denunciation of fellow Marxist writers whom he saw to be 
influenced by it that set off the controversy. The writers of 
the Left were predominantly concerned with a Marxist orientated 
aesthetic. Lukacs. primarily interested in his brand of realism, 
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uses Expressionism to set it off against the explication of his 
own work. Brecht, angry at Lukacs' hegemonic, authoritarian 
attitude, defends the right of artists to decide for themselves 
what they consider they should employ in the course of practising 
their art. He, in turn. sets off Lukacs· essay against the 
explication of his own opinions, defending his methods in the 
process. He does not so much defend Expressionism as he defends 
his right to make use of it in spite of being a Marxist writer. 
And yet, even though one can see Expressionism in the light of 
a pretext for this debate, it can nevertheless be seen as the 
central point of contact between the latter and the later dispute 
between Lyotard and Habermas. It is the response of Marxist 
writers to the whole phenomenon of modernism, of which 
Expressionism is a part, that could be seen as the real stake, 
the subtext of both these debates. A clarification of the 
response to modernism must inevitably force a re-assessment of 
where each writer stands in his relation to the Marxist position 
in terms of aesthetics. Can one, for instance, truly be a 
Marxist writer and still embrace modernism? 
In terms of the works examined in this dissertation, all of which 
put forward a particular view on modernism, we are talking about 
a movement which has run parallel to Marxism, starting from about 
the middle of the nineteenth· century up to present times. 
Whether referred to as the Avant-garde, Impressionism, 
Expressionism, Surrealism, Modernism and Postmodernism, it is all 
part and parcel of the phenomenon of modernism in terms of this 
discussion. Each of the writers refer to it from an outside 
position, that is they respond to it from the point of view of 
how it can positively or negatively have impact on their own 
persuasion. Lukacs rejects it outright. treating it rather like 
a contaminating desease, fearing that it would have a subversive 
effect within his own movement. Brecht, having initially been 
involved in it, does not dissociate himself from it. finding 
aspects of it indispensable for his own work. Lyotard takes •:me 
~spect of it as a safety latch to hold up impending disaster, 
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whereas Habermas gives serious attention to its concerns and 
impact on society, but is of the opinion that something has gone 
wrong with it, which can be remedied by changing it into 
something else . 
It is the position of art and its function in society which is 
at stake here. In Kantian terms art is part of the faculty of 
.Judgement and stands outside the ethical and the cognitive 
spheres. In other words it does not interfere in the other 
domains but it is sovereign in its own right. In terms of 
Marxism, however, art lost its separate sovereign status. For 
it to have any recognition, it has to be in the service of 
furthering the struggle for socio-political change. The merit 
and the relevance of a work is assessed on that basis. Instead 
of simply giving pleasure or pain on purely aesthetic grounds, 
art now has to be combative against the enemy in the class 
struggle. However, it is not allowed to be critical of Marxism 
itself, be it in terms of the theories, the practitioners. or a 
state which has Marxism as its official policy. It would thus 
not function as a critical control of the system itself. This 
can be seen to be demonstrated by the Lukacs /Brecht debate . 
Lukacs combats everything which he sees to be in any way 
detrimental to the Marxist doctrine. even to the point of 
denouncing the work of writers who openly commit themselves to 
Marxism, but does not criticise the practices of the Soviet state 
which were both oppressive and totalitarian. Brecht's articles, 
which were critical of Lukacs, were never published. either 
because they were dismissed or because he feared for his life 
should they have reached publication in Das Wort in Moscow. 
Nevertheless, Brecht. in line with his Ha~:xist commitment. 
created his art to combat capitalism. He. too, although he was 
not even a citizen, did not criticise the practices of the Soviet 
state. 
What is interesting about the Marxist view of art in terms of 
this debate. is the question of realism. If one is to take it 
in Lu~acs sense. then art has, ln fact, crossed over the 
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divisions of the faculties: it claims cognitive as well as 
aesthetical status (in Jameson's words) and its prime impact 1s 
to be in the ethical sphere in terms of socio-political 
improvement. Art, here, is in the service of a social theory. 
This is of interest if one considers that Habermas, and even 
Lyotard, both, however much they may have moved away from some 
of the aspects of Marxism, also speak from the perspective of 
social theory when they talk about the avant-garde. In other 
words, the cleavages between the faculties are, in fact, closed 
up in the Marxist theory of realism. It must be realized, 
however, that the faculties do not stand in equal balance to each 
other, the aesthetic faculty having been subsumed in the socio-
ethical one. 
The difference between this position of art in society and that 
of art in the sense of the Avant-garde, is that the latter stands 
1n a critical position towards the society in which it functions. 
It must be made clear, though, that it does not do this in the 
sense of a social function. It acts independently. Criticism 
of a way of life in a particulr society can be deduced rather 
than that is is spelt out in any specific way. Avant-gardism 
claims neither cognitive nor ethical status, but demands complete 
sovereignty in its own sphere. It assigns itself not only the 
right to function on its own terms but to challenge all preceding 
conventions, be they social or artistic. It stands outside of 
and above society. It claims originality, which recognises no 
higher authority. This is the element that is at once disturbing 
and challenging to the four writers in question. Art, in this 
sense, cannot be contained by any official power or philosophical 
doctrine, and must thus stand in a subversive relationship to any 
system which claims to contain and control all aspects of life. 
One can either dismiss it as harmless and ineffectual, or one can 
actively suppress it. One can also attempt to change its nature 
and function. On the other hand one can make use of certain 
aspects of-it. 
Luk3.cs reacts to avant-gardism by simply dismissing the w!K•le 
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movement, denigrating the artists without looking closely at what 
they are doing. As far he is concerned Marxism and modernism are 
mutually exclusive. Haberrnas tries to tame the alienating 
effects of avant-gardism by recognising its merits but changing 
its status to fit into his system of communicative reason. Art 
must come back from its outsider position into the fold of 
society to serve social needs. In this regard he can be compared 
to Lukacs, although he goes about it in a more subtle manner. 
Brecht is the only one of the four writers who speaks from the 
perspective of the artist. He can be seen to have combined 
avant-gardism and Marxism in his art. On the one hand his work 
is in the Marxist cause, clearly seeing its function to be 
subservient to this. On the other hand, he claims the right of 
the independence of the artist when creating his works. Within 
the constraints of his own understanding of Marxism with its 
dialectic. he does not allow anyone to prescribe to him what he 
should think and how he should act, especially not someone who 
is not an artist himself. He insists on self-sufficient 
expertise in the artistic sphere. However, the combination of 
these two commitments does carry a cost. The modernist element 
which was so prominent in his early works, to then almost 
disappear in his first Marxist-orientated didactic plays, 
emerges again and can be seen to unfold itself with increasing 
magnitude in his subsequent plays. He stopped writing new plays 
once he had moved to East Berlin, spending his last years 
experimenting with the staging of the plays he had written. The 
Marxist parameter which contains his work could possibly be seen 
as the element which prevented him from progressing fully forward 
into the poststructuralist mode which moved to a deconstruction 
of all master narratives. In other words, poststructuralism is 
the point at which there is a conscious dissolution of the master 
narrative, the narrative of a unified reality, into disparate 
discourses. The fragmentation of the form. as employed and 
developed by Brecht, would take the leap over to the content. 
:i:n his case, it is possible that the master narrative of the 
realism of Marxism prevented the ultimate fragmentation of the 
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content. However, if one were to look at Brecht's plays, looking 
past the Marxist framework, one would see many postmodern 
features: the pastiche element in the form of the story within 
a well known story, which also effects the upheaving of time 
sequence, the different voices and perspectives, the breaking up 
of the illusion of reality, and the use of surface phenomena. 
In short, we are talking about a fragmentation in terms of time 
sequence, story line, the actor as one whole character, the unity 
of scenery, story and music. We are talking about the spaces 
left between the many fragments which constitute the play. The 
main didactic message of the play is time and again subverted and 
put into question by the disparate elements of the form. If one 
were now to look back at Lukacs' criticism of Ernst Bloch in 
terms of how the Expressionists, in his eyes, mistook the 
fragmentary nature of surface reality for a fragmentation of 
total reality, one could say that his fears were not ungrounded. 
In terms of his fears of the threat to his concept of totality, 
in the Marxist sense, future developments, be it in the form of 
poststructuralism or postmodernism has had the effect of 
invalidating that concept. 
Lyotard, does, in fact, reject this concept completely. The 
fragmentation we feel in life is due to the fragmentary nature 
of reality, which can only be seen as a whole if it is 
artificially constructed as such by language, a language which 
is refused the separate status of all its language games. It is 
the separateness of the language game of the avant-garde that he 
not only recognises but defends so vehemently. Art, in its 
ability to present the unrepresentable must be the watchdog, as 
it were, to counteract the danger of totalitarianism. What must 
be remembered here, though, is that Lyotard, nevertheless, does 
not see art from the perspective of its own sphere. He, too. 
also makes it subservient to his social theory, co-opting it into 
his discourse, determining its function. Ironically it is the 
very element of being ungraspab le in terms of any theory. 
including his own. that he finds indispensable to his theory. 
The fact that he does not speak from the perspective of t~:.e 
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avant-garde itself would be clear to any artist who tries to 
follow his injunction. Brecht could have told him that art 
cannot be produced in the long run if there is no audience . 
Also, if there is no audience, how does the artist have an impact 
on society? Presenting the unrepresentable, not only in content 
but also in form, would, however much sense it would make ln 
theory, result in only a tiny, exclusive group of spectators. 
The question could be asked whether, 
know ledge of the truth about reality, 
even if one did have a 
there would be anything 
wrong in consciously creating an illusion, a false reality, as 
it were, to cope with what may be an unpleasant state of affairs. 
What comes across in both these debates, especially with 
Habermas, but with the others as well, is that there is a basic 
longing in human nature for a wholeness in life, be it socially 
or intellectually. If reality does not correspond with this 
longing, is it wrong to create the fantasy that will them cope 
with this truth? We have an example of this in Cervantes. 
At one stage Don Quixote asks the canon to tell him what is wrong 
in living out a fantasy if this helps one to be a better person? 
Pondering this one could say that that is how we exist all the 
time. Often it is a hope, an illusion, a fantasy, which are the 
insubstantial steps towards substantial action. These actions. 
in turn, create a new substantial reality. 
Habermas could be seen to develop his theory of communication in 
response to the human longing for an experience of wholeness . 
This could be seen in a positive as well as negative light. He 
proposes to actively create a united new reality. This is not 
to be brought about by some authority which forces it on society. 
as for instance, the church, a doctrine, or a totalitarian state. 
Rather. the people, themselves, would be the authority by :t 
process of consensus based on a communication which is the result 
of an interaction of the faculties. Art would be in the position 
of being a·part of this consensus. contributing to the unifying 
process. 
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One can now ask why Lyotard should be so adamantly against this. 
I think one reason is that it looks almost too good to be true. 
He remembers the two totalitarian states and their vicious 
methods in this very century. Both these systems had two faces; 
the initially beautiful one in terms of the ideal, which could 
be seen as a manifestation of power in its marketing technique, 
and the face of power without its mask, manifested in terror. 
One could say that the nostalgia for the whole and one springs 
from a basic existential fear and must be taken as a given. It 
can thus easily be exploited by any power. It will gladly lend 
itself to any story that supports it. In Lyotard's analysis of 
the role of power and knowledge based on a picture which in turn 
is based on an illusion, this illusion may be insubstantial, 
based on worthy ideals, but would, nevertheless, support the 
substantial reality of keeping power in place. The difference 
between an individual, like Don Quixote. making use of a fantasy 
to cope with life, is that in the case of a general consensus a 
large mass of people are involved. In the individual instance 
there would probably be an awareness of the fantasy as a fantasy, 
as is the case of Don Quixote, who exercised his right to choose 
his particular fantasy. In the case of the masses there is less 
likelihood of an awareness of the fantasy as a fantasy as one 
sees it mirrored in everyone around one, an unspoken general 
consensus having been reached to believe in it. A frightening 
aspect is that there is no individual choice. Once an illusion. 
upheld by consensus, has got to the stage of supporting a 
totalitarian state, the united masses become in themselves an 
unwieldy force of power. Methods of terror are used to keep them 
in control, while they, themselves, carry the potential of terror 
within them. 
What can be seen from all this is that every theory and practice 
as put forward by these four writers can be seen in a positive 
and in a negative light in terms of power relations. The issue 
of art is· only truly explored by Brecht, who is an artist 
himself. Lyotard can be seen to be closer to his views in terms 
of an affirmative attitude towards the element of fragmentation. 
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Habermas can be seen to be more in line with Lukacs in terms of 
a striving towards unity, even though he dissociates himself from 
the authority of a doctrine, making the consensus between 
reasonable people the authority. Where Brecht and Habermas can 
be seen to be similar, however, is in their optimistic belief in 
human nature, in the future, and in their own ability to work 
towards this creatively and courageously. Never losing sight of 
the realities as encountered in every day praxis, they work from 
the assumption that theory cannot be effective without a positive 
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